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FROM INDIVIDUAL CONTROL TO SOCIAL PROTECTION: NEW 
PARADIGMS FOR PRIVACY LAW IN THE AGE OF PREDICTIVE 
ANALYTICS 
DENNIS D. HIRSCH* 
ABSTRACT 
 What comes after the control paradigm?  For decades, privacy 
law has sought to provide individuals with notice and choice and 
so give them control over their personal data.  But what happens 
when this regulatory paradigm breaks down? 
 Predictive analytics forces us to confront this challenge.  Indi-
viduals cannot understand how predictive analytics uses their sur-
face data to infer latent, far more sensitive data about them, and 
so they can no longer make meaningful choices about whether to 
share their surface data in the first place.  Predictive analytics also 
creates threats (such as harmful bias, manipulation, and proce-
dural unfairness) that go well beyond privacy.  Taken together, 
these two features make it difficult, if not impossible, for traditional 
privacy law to protect people in the algorithmic economy.  If pri-
vacy law is to offer meaningful protection, it must shift from a lib-
eralist focus on individual control, to a social protection model in 
which public authorities set substantive standards that defend peo-
ple against algorithmic threats. 
 Leading scholars have recognized the need for such a shift and 
have proposed ways to achieve it.  This Article will argue that, 
while they move the ball forward, these proposals do not provide 
an adequate solution.  It will propose that the Federal Trade Com-
mission (“FTC”) use its unfairness authority to draw substantive 
lines between data analytics practices that are socially appropri-
ate and fair, and those that are inappropriate and unfair, and will 
examine how the FTC would make such determinations.  It will 
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argue that this existing authority, which requires no new legisla-
tion, provides a comprehensive and politically legitimate way to 
create much needed societal boundaries around corporate use of 
predictive analytics.  It will conclude that the FTC could use its 
unfairness authority to address the threats that the algorithmic 
economy creates.  Were the FTC to do so, that would move us past 
the liberalist paradigm of privacy law and towards a legal system 
that can protect people in the age of predictive analytics and arti-
ficial intelligence. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Some years ago, Target analyzed its customers’ past purchasing 
histories to predict, with great accuracy, which of its current female 
customers were pregnant.  It then showered these women with cou-
pons for baby goods.  A high school girl’s receipt of the coupons 
ended up revealing to her father that she was pregnant, a condition 
that she knew about but had not yet disclosed to her father.1  Target 
knew about her pregnancy before her father did, and its actions 
disclosed this hidden fact to him. 
*** 
 Flooded with tens of thousands of employment applications, 
Amazon developed an artificial intelligence (“AI”) tool that could 
identify resumes that resembled those of its current employees, and 
so presumably met Amazon’s hiring criteria, and separated them 
from those that did not.  Amazon’s existing workforce is dispro-
portionately male.  The AI tool accordingly learned to reject appli-
cants whose resumes said that they had gone to all-women colleges 
or otherwise identified them as female.  Fortunately, Amazon 
caught this bias before it fully implemented the AI tool.2 
*** 
 Cambridge Analytica gained access to a massive trove of Face-
book users’ “likes.”  From this information, it was able to infer the 
personality types of tens of millions of individual Facebook users.  
It then targeted these individuals with Trump campaign ads de-
signed to appeal, unconsciously, to their specific psychological 
type3—an approach that Scientific American described as a “ma-
nipulative strateg[y] . . . designed to bypass one’s cognitive de-
fenses.”4  
*** 
What do these three examples have in common?  Each involves corpo-
rate use of predictive analytics, a technological process that analyzes surface 
                                                          
 1.  Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.  
 2.  Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias Against 
Women, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automa-
tion-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-women-
idUSKCN1MK08G.  
 3.  See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as 
Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/fa-
cebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html.  
 4.  Marcello Ienca & Effy Vayena, Cambridge Analytica and Online Manipulation, SCI. AM. 
(Mar. 30, 2018), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/cambridge-analytica-and-
online-manipulation/. 
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data in order to infer and act on the latent information that lies beneath the 
surface.5  Once available only to the government and the largest companies, 
predictive analytics is today so widely used that it and the technologies based 
on it—big data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence—have 
become integral to the information economy.6  Companies use these technol-
ogies to diagnose diseases, improve medical treatments, design better educa-
tional strategies, and make businesses more efficient, to name just a few of 
predictive analytics’ many beneficial applications.7  But, as the examples 
above illustrate, corporate use of predictive analytics also poses risks of pri-
vacy invasion (the Target example), discrimination (the Amazon example), 
and manipulation (the Cambridge Analytica example).8  Society needs rules 
for predictive analytics that will allow this technology to achieve its many 
benefits, while protecting people against its very real threats.9 
The existing system of privacy law is not able to protect people against 
these threats.10  This is not due to a mistake or an omission.  It is due to the 
very nature of privacy law which was created at a different time and for a 
different set of technologies.  Privacy law seeks to give individuals control 
over their personal information—to enable them to decide whether to share 
their personal data, with whom, and for what purpose.  But predictive analyt-
ics takes surface data and infers latent information from it.  This makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, for people to know what they are really sharing 
when they agree to disclose their surface data.11  In this way, the rise of pre-
dictive analytics undermines the very foundations of existing privacy law.12  
                                                          
 5.  ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS 4–5 (2016); U.K. INFO. COMM’R OFFICE, BIG 
DATA AND DATA PROTECTION 2, 5 (2014), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/docu-
ments/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf. 
 6.  Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User Control in the Age of 
Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240–43 (2013). 
 7. VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 1–6 (2013); Dennis 
Hirsch, Predictive Analytics Law and Policy: A New Field Emerges, 14 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 1, 4 (2017). 
 8.  Hirsch, supra note 7, at 4.   
 9.  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, UNLOCKING THE VALUE OF PERSONAL DATA: FROM 
COLLECTION TO USAGE 3 (2013), http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/WEF_IT_UnlockingValuePersonalData_CollectionUsage_Report_2013.pdf (ex-
plaining that society needs to govern big data analytics in order to unlock its value). 
 10.  FRED CATE ET AL., DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: REVISING 
THE 1980 OECD GUIDELINES 6–7 (2013), https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/archive/downloads/publica-
tions/Data_Protection_Principles_for_the_21st_Century.pdf; Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, 
Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC 
GOOD 44, 45 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014); Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a 
New Beginning?, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 74, 78–79 (2013); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, 
at 242. 
 11.  Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 431, 446–47 (2016). 
 12.  Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. 
REV. 952, 953 (2017). 
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If society is to protect people in the era of predictive analytics, it needs a new 
strategy grounded in social protection rather than individual control.13 
To understand where privacy law is today, and where it needs to go, it 
is helpful to think more broadly about how legal systems evolve.  German 
social theorist Gunther Teubner has explained that Western legal systems 
begin with a liberalist preference for individual choice over state control.14  
Initially, the state’s main role is to support individual choice by enforcing 
contract and property rights.  Over time, however, society increases in com-
plexity to the point that individuals can no longer make meaningful choices 
about important matters such as the safety of the food or drugs they pur-
chase.15  In response, the state passes substantive laws, such as food and drug 
laws, to protect people where they can no longer protect themselves.16 
The law of landlord and tenant clearly illustrates this evolution.  Prior 
to the industrial revolution, courts subscribed to the doctrine of caveat les-
see—let the lessee beware.17  Over time, however, simple farm dwellings 
gave way to tenements and apartment buildings with complex heating, 
plumbing, and electrical systems.18  Tenants were no longer able to evaluate 
the health or safety of such dwellings, and many ended up living in substand-
ard, unhealthy conditions.  Courts and legislatures responded with the im-
plied warranty of habitability through which they imposed societal standards 
designed to ensure safe and healthful housing.19  A system of law premised 
on individual choice and control had found itself unable to cope with an in-
creasingly complex set of technologies, and so evolved to encompass societal 
standards that would better protect people. 
That is the same evolutionary shift that privacy law needs to undertake 
today.  Existing U.S. privacy law follows the liberalist model.20  It defines 
privacy as the ability to control one’s personal information.21  It then seeks 
                                                          
 13.  Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 74. 
 14.  Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 239, 252–54 (1983) (stating that formal law develops into substantive law, which “shifts the 
focus from autonomy to regulation”). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. at 253–54 (“The justification of substantive law is to be found in the perceived need 
for the collective regulation of economic and social activities to compensate for inadequacies of the 
market.”). 
 17.  See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 449 (2019) (noting that a landlord generally 
did not have a duty to provide a habitable rental property). 
 18.  See Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207 (Vt. 1984). 
 19.  Id. at 207–08; 15 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 48:11 (4th ed. 1990). 
 20.  Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L. J. 1180, 
1182 (2017) (stating that ideals of privacy “resonate[] with American ideals of individualism, de-
mocracy, and consumerism”). 
 21.  ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 41 (1967); Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against 
Idealising Control, 4 EUROPEAN DATA PRO. L. REV. 423, 423–24 (2018) (“[M]ost people in indus-
try and policy think of privacy and data protection in terms of control. . . . Lawmakers, regulators, 
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to facilitate such control by requiring companies to notify individuals in ad-
vance about the collection and use of their data, give individuals a degree of 
choice as to whether to allow these data practices, and then employ the infor-
mation only for the purpose that the individuals authorized.22  This regime’s 
central aim—and so the main goal of U.S. privacy law—is to give individuals 
control over their personal information and so to give them “privacy” as the 
law defines it.  Professor Paul Schwartz has termed this as the “privacy-con-
trol” paradigm of privacy law.23  The control paradigm is at the core of the 
Fair Information Practice Principles (“FIPPs”) that have served as a leitmotif 
for privacy law.24  It is at the heart of most U.S. privacy law statutes.25  And 
it is reflected in the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) Section 5 decep-
tiveness authority which holds companies to the promises they make to indi-
viduals about their data practices.26 
The control paradigm has worked relatively well for the information 
collection and processing activities for which it was first designed in the 
1970s.  However, as happened in food, drug, housing, and so many other 
areas, increasingly complex social conditions are making it impossible for 
individuals meaningfully to make choices about the collection and use of 
their personal information.27  This has been true for some time.  Individuals 
have long struggled to read and assimilate all the privacy notices with which 
they are confronted.28  But policymakers have remained committed to the 
                                                          
and judges seem to have more or less settled on a notion that the key to privacy generally, and data 
protection specifically, is control over personal information.”). 
 22.  See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 36–37 (6th 
ed. 2018). 
 23.  Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1613 
n.15 (1999). 
 24.  Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 260 (“In the United States, ‘notice and choice’ has 
been the central axis of privacy regulation for more than a decade.”).  The Fair Information Practices 
have “played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the United States.”  Marc Rotenberg, Fair 
Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 1, 15 (2001); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, 
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS viii (1973).  
 25.  See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) 
(requiring that children’s website obtain parental consent regarding the collection and disclosure of 
their children’s personal information); Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2710(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (2012) (requiring that a videotape service provider obtain the consent of the 
consumer for each instance of disclosure); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1) 
(2012) (requiring cable service providers to notify subscribers of the nature as well as uses of the 
personal information they collect). 
 26.  Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 27.  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Yann Padova, Regime Change? Enabling Big Data Through 
Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 315, 332 (2016). 
 28.  Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: 
J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543, 563–64 (2008) (concluding that if individuals read all the 
policy notices they encountered, the average American would have to spend forty minutes a day 
reading privacy notices, totaling 244 hours a year); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 444 (de-
claring individual notice and choice to be “an illusion”). 
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traditional privacy law approach, trying with mixed success to make it work 
better, rather than looking in new directions. 
That approach is no longer tenable.  The rise of predictive analytics has 
changed the game.  Predictive analytics takes massive amounts of data and 
analyzes them in order to locate correlations and patterns.  It then turns these 
patterns into a profile and applies them prospectively so as to infer additional 
information and make actionable predictions about the future.29  That is what 
Target, Amazon, and Cambridge Analytica did in the examples mentioned 
above.  These companies found patterns in data about past customers and 
used it to make predictions about current customers.30  Today many compa-
nies are using this approach to drive their decisionmaking. 
The emergence of predictive analytics as a central feature of the digital 
economy profoundly impacts privacy law’s control paradigm.31  Previously, 
individuals who chose to share a particular piece of personal information 
knew what they were disclosing and could make a meaningful choice about 
whether or not to do so.32  Today, however, companies can use this surface 
data to infer additional, latent information that may be far more sensitive than 
that which the person thought they were sharing.33  For example, Target used 
purchase histories to infer pregnancy status; Cambridge Analytica took Fa-
cebook “likes” and inferred psychological type.  In such a world, individuals 
cannot understand what information they are really disclosing and, as a con-
sequence, cannot make a meaningful choice about whether or not to share the 
information in the first place.34 
This is not a trivial shift.  As will be further explained below,35 in addi-
tion to its many benefits, predictive analytics poses significant threats.  Com-
panies can violate individual privacy and exploit hidden vulnerabilities.  Au-
tomated, algorithmic decisionmaking about who should get a loan, a job, 
                                                          
 29.  See SIEGEL, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 30.  Cf., id. at 15 (defining predictive analytics as “[t]echnology that learns from experience 
(data) to predict the future behavior of individuals in order to drive better decisions.)” 
 31.  Hartzog, supra note 12, at 972.  In his discussion of algorithmic decisionmaking and the 
problems it causes for the Fair Information Practices, Hartzog highlights issues that are related, but 
distinct, from those discussed here, including that “it is very difficult to erase bias from autonomous 
systems . . . that the cost of these systems [is] not borne equally by all members of society, and . . . 
that people tend to irrationally trust conclusions reached by computers more than conclusions 
reached by humans.”  Id. at 971–72.  These concerns, too, are relevant and important.  
 32.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
 33.  Id.; Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 45–46; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 
240.  
 34.  See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 81, 83 (2013) (stating that predictive inferences make “[e]veryone . . . more susceptible to 
providing information” because “that [information] gets taken out of its original context” to connect 
X to Y). 
 35.  See infra Sections III.B–C. 
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insurance, housing, and many other important opportunities, can encode bi-
ases and produce a new form of “digital redlining.”36  The black box decision-
making processes of predictive analytics are opaque and highly difficult to 
challenge.  Predictive analytics thus threatens people with privacy invasions, 
manipulation, bias, and procedural unfairness.37 
These are real threats.  Yet individuals cannot use the tools that privacy 
law has provided them—notice, choice, and purpose limitation—to protect 
themselves from these threats.  Just as the shift from simple farm dwellings 
to complex urban ones undermined caveat lessee and required lawmakers to 
develop the implied warranty of habitability, so the move from small to big 
data puts people at risk and the traditional privacy law paradigm in crisis.38  
This shift forces us to ask how the law can protect people in an information 
economy where, increasingly, individuals cannot protect themselves.  It re-
quires us to search for a new regulatory paradigm for the age of predictive 
analytics.39 
This search for a new regulatory paradigm is one of the most compelling 
inquiries in privacy law, and privacy law scholarship, today.  Leading voices 
recognize that traditional privacy law cannot protect people in a world of 
predictive analytics; they propose new ways to handle this vital task.  Profes-
sors Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain and, writing separately, Professors 
Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog, have argued for the expansion of fidu-
ciary duties.40  Professors Helen Nissenbaum and Solon Barocas have called 
for a contextual integrity-based approach.41  Microsoft’s Craig Mundie and, 
                                                          
 36.  EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING 
VALUES 53 (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_pri-
vacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf. 
 37.  See infra Section III.C (describing these threats in greater detail); see also Hartzog, supra 
note 12, at 970 (discussing how algorithmic decisionmaking poses risks that include “threats to due 
process, disparate impact on minority and other vulnerable communities, [and] invasions of privacy 
and stigmatization” (footnotes omitted)). 
 38.  See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 333 (2016) (“Our regulatory regime, premised on quaint ideas of privacy control . . . is 
simply inadequate to address the kinds of decision-making and inferential powers that information-
intensive industries now possess.”). 
 39.  MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 7, at 17 (“New principles are needed for the 
age of big data . . . .”); Hartzog, supra note 12, at 954; cf. Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive 
Robots, 74 MD. L. REV. 785, 787–88 (2015) (stating that coming age of robots profoundly chal-
lenges the existing consumer protection regime). 
 40.  Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1183, 1186 (2016); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 457; Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, 
A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/. 
 41.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 47–48. 
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writing separately, Professor Fred Cate, Professor Victor Mayer-Schön-
berger, and Peter Cullen have argued for use-based regulation.42  Professors 
Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale and, writing separately, Professors Kate 
Crawford and Jason Schultz, have called for importing due process norms 
into the regulation of big data.43  These authors do not directly refer to one 
another in their articles, but they are in conversation.  Each is proposing a 
new regulatory paradigm for the age of predictive analytics, one that will 
protect people where the control paradigm will not. 
This Article will describe and evaluate each of these proposals.  Build-
ing on work in this area44 and an essay that this author published in 2015,45 
this Article will then explore an alternative solution.  It will argue that the 
FTC should use its “unfairness authority” to draw lines between big data 
practices that are socially appropriate and those that are not, between those 
that are fair and those that are unfair.46 
Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the power to declare and enforce 
against “unfair or deceptive [business] acts or practices.”47  This short phrase 
gives the FTC two distinct powers: the authority to enforce against business 
practices that are “deceptive;” and the ability to enforce against business 
practices that are “unfair.”  The FTC has become the nation’s leading privacy 
                                                          
 42.  Craig Mundie, Privacy Pragmatism: Focus on Data Use, Not Data Collection, 93 FOREIGN 
AFF., Mar./Apr. 2014, at 28, 29 (arguing that we should “shift[] the focus [away] from limiting the 
collection and retention of data to controlling data . . . the moment when it is used”). 
 43.  Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and 
Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 93, 128 
(2014). 
 44.  Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43 at 23–24 (calling on the FTC to use its unfairness au-
thority to oversee credit scoring systems); Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, 
Unfairness and Externalities, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y. 425 (2011) (explaining that the 
FTC could use its unfairness authority to govern corporate data practices). 
 45.  In a 2015 essay, the author briefly explored whether the FTC could use its unfairness au-
thority to draw enforceable lines between fair, and unfair, uses of big data analytics.  Dennis D. 
Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is it? Big Data, Discrimination and the FTC’s Unfairness Authority, 103 
KY. L.J. 345 (2015).  This Article explores in greater depth the FTC’s ability to use its unfairness 
authority in this way. 
 46.  Other scholars have also identified the FTC’s unfairness authority as a potential mechanism 
for the governance of emerging technologies.  See Hartzog, supra note 39, at 811–15 (arguing that 
the FTC could use its unfairness authority to regulate cognizable consumer harms from robots); 
Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial Intelligence & Bots: Is the FTC 
Keeping Pace? 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514, 522, 525–26 (2018) (explaining that the FTC has cau-
tiously used its unfairness authority to protect privacy and should continue to do so); Richards & 
Hartzog, supra note 11, at 471 (suggesting that the FTC could use its Section 5 authority to regulate 
unreasonable self-dealing and so enforce fiduciary duties).  These works do not focus on predictive 
analytics per se in the way that MacCarthy’s, Citron & Pasquale’s, and this author’s 2015 essay do.  
MacCarthy, supra note 44; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43; Hirsch, supra note 45.  Taken to-
gether, however, this body of work points to the important role that the FTC’s unfairness authority 
could play with respect to predictive analytics and other information-intensive technologies. 
 47.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
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regulator largely by relying on the first half of this power—its “deceptiveness 
authority.”48  In the algorithmic society, the FTC should put an equal empha-
sis on the other half of its Section 5 power—its “unfairness authority.”49 
The FTC’s unfairness authority differs fundamentally from its decep-
tiveness jurisdiction. Deceptiveness authority seeks to facilitate and enforce 
individual choices.  Unfairness authority does not—it applies in those situa-
tions where individuals cannot make meaningful choices.50  In those circum-
stances, it empowers the FTC to draw substantive lines between business acts 
or practices that are socially appropriate and fair and those that are inappro-
priate and unfair.51  The move from deceptiveness authority to unfairness au-
thority is thus a shift from a liberalist legal paradigm that seeks to facilitate 
individual choice and control to one that offers social protection where indi-
viduals cannot protect themselves.52  Such a shift is needed if the law is to 
protect individuals in the algorithmic society and allow machine learning, AI, 
and other forms of predictive analytics to remain socially acceptable. 
Part II of this Article will describe the intellectual roots and core features 
of the control paradigm that currently dominates privacy law.  Part III will 
describe predictive analytics, the risks that it poses to individuals and the 
broader society, and why control-based regulation is not able effectively to 
reduce these risks.  Part IV will describe and assess the exciting new branch 
of legal scholarship that has identified this gap and proposed ways to fill it.  
Part V will explore an alternative: having the FTC use its unfairness authority 
to draw substantive lines between predictive analytics practices that are fair, 
and those that are unfair.  Part V will then develop a theory of the FTC’s 
unfairness authority grounded in regulatory history; propose that the FTC 
employ its unfairness authority to establish rules of the road for predictive 
analytics and protect people from the threats that it poses; and explain why 
this approach shares many of the strengths, but avoids many of the weak-
nesses, of the other main proposals.  Part VI will argue that the FTC Act53 
                                                          
 48.  Daniel Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 628 (2014); see infra notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 49.  See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 347 (arguing that the FTC should expand its use of its 
unfairness authority in order to regulate information-intensive industries better).  Hoofnagle calls 
on the FTC to develop a broader theory of how unfairness authority maps onto the advanced infor-
mation economy.  Id.  This Article attempts to articulate such a theory with respect to algorithmic 
determinations that negatively impact individuals and society. 
 50.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012) (stating unfairness authority applies to situations where harm 
to consumers “is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves”). 
 51.  HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 130–31. 
 52.  MacCarthy, supra note 44, at 430 (stating that certain practices are simply unfair even if 
the information at issue is disclosed to the data subject); see J. Howard Beales, The FTC’s Use of 
Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, FTC (May 30, 2003), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-res-
urrection (recognizing that the FTC can use its unfairness authority to “attack practices that cause 
substantial injury,” but could not be addressed under the FTC’s deceptiveness authority). 
 53.  15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
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and recent judicial decisions interpreting it provide a sound legal basis for the 
FTC to use its unfairness authority in this way.  This Article will conclude 
that, in order to protect people in the algorithmic economy, the legal system 
needs to shift from a liberalist paradigm to one grounded in social protection 
and that the FTC’s unfairness authority provides a practical and politically 
legitimate way of doing so. 
II.  THE CONTROL PARADIGM 
Many cite Justice Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s The Right to 
Privacy54 as the main source of U.S. privacy law.55  Brandeis and Warren 
famously argued that those who transgress bounds of appropriateness and so 
invade others’ “right to be let alone” should be held liable in tort.56  Their 
theory is the root of the privacy torts.  But it is not the source of U.S. statutory 
and regulatory privacy law.  These are much more grounded in Professor 
Alan Westin’s highly influential 1967 book Privacy and Freedom.57  It is 
Westin’s book that provides the intellectual underpinnings of modern privacy 
legislation and regulation. 
Professor Westin starts from the idea that humans are social beings who 
would find living completely unseen by others to be a form of torture.58  But 
they are also individuals who would find it equally painful to be completely 
transparent to others in their thoughts and actions.59  In order to flourish, hu-
man beings need to find a balance between these two extremes; different peo-
ple strike this balance differently.  Some are happiest when they share more 
of themselves with others; some, when they disclose less.60  Privacy is the 
ability to draw this line—to determine which aspects of our personal infor-
mation we will share with others.  “[T]his is the core of the ‘right of individ-
ual privacy’—the right of the individual to decide for himself, with only ex-
traordinary exceptions in the interests of society, when and on what terms his 
                                                          
 54.  Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 55.  See, e.g., Ben Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s the Right to Privacy and the Birth of the 
Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624–25 (2002); McSweeny, supra note 46, at 516. 
 56.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 195. 
 57.  WESTIN, supra note 21. 
 58.  Id. at 40.  The stresses of solitary confinement demonstrate this and back up Westin’s 
claim.  See Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Anal-
ysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 500 (1997). 
 59.  WESTIN, supra note 21, at 41. 
 60.  Id. at 40–41. 
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acts should be revealed to the general public.”61  Stated a bit differently, pri-
vacy is control over the disclosure of one’s personal information.62  When 
one has this control, one has privacy; when one does not, one lacks privacy.  
Following Professor Schwartz, this Article refers to this as the “control par-
adigm” of privacy.63 
Privacy statutes and regulations that govern the private sector64 gener-
ally seek to provide individuals with control over their personal information, 
achieving Professor Westin’s definition of privacy.65  They use three core 
mechanisms to do this: notice, consent, and purpose limitation.66  They re-
quire companies to notify an individual before collecting, using, or sharing 
that person’s information;67 to provide the individual with some degree of 
choice as to whether or not to consent to this data collection and processing;68 
and to use the information only for the purposes specified in the notice to 
which the person consented.69  In theory, these three mainstays of privacy 
law and policy provide individuals with control over the collection and pro-
cessing of their personal information and so give them “privacy.” 
Notice, consent, and purpose limitation figure importantly in the Fair 
Information Practice Principles 70 and are at the heart of most federal privacy 
                                                          
 61.  Id. at 42; see also ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM xxxi (reissued edition, 2014) 
(“Most definitions of privacy today agree on the core concept that I presented in 1967: that privacy 
is the individual’s claim to determine what information about himself or herself should be known 
to others.”). 
 62.  Hartzog, supra note 12, at 973 (identifying this dominant definition of privacy and tracing 
it back to Westin’s seminal work); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 437. 
 63.  Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1664 (referencing the “paradigm of privacy-control”); accord 
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 436 (discussing the “control principle” of privacy).  
 64.  A different legal regime, grounded in the Fourth Amendment, applies to government col-
lection and use of data.  See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amend-
ment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1085–86 (2002). 
 65.  Schwartz, supra note 23, at 1659 (“From the age of computer mainframes in the 1960s to 
the current reign of the Internet’s decentralized networks, academics and the law have gravitated 
towards the idea of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one’s data.”). 
 66.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 57 (“[I]nformed consent is a natural corollary of 
the idea that privacy means control over information about oneself.”); Rotenberg, supra note 24, at 
15 (recognizing that the Fair Information Practices, which center on notice, consent and purpose 
limitation, have “played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the United States”). 
 67.  See, e.g., Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(1) (2012) (requiring cable 
service providers to notify subscribers of the nature as well as uses of the personal information they 
collect).  
 68.  See, e.g., Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii) (requir-
ing that children’s website obtain parental consent regarding the collection and disclosure of their 
children’s personal information). 
 69.  See, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (requiring that a 
videotape service provider obtain the consent of the consumer for each instance of disclosure).  The 
Act was later amended to allow for consumers to consent to disclosure for a period of two years. Id. 
§ 2710(b)(2)(B)(ii)(II).  
 70.  Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 260 (“In the United States, ‘notice and choice’ has 
been the central axis of privacy regulation for more than a decade.”).  The Fair Information Practices 
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statutes.71  They also animate the FTC’s “deceptiveness authority.”  As was 
briefly explained above,72 Section 5 of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to 
identify and enforce against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” that affect 
commerce.73  The FTC has successfully asserted that “deceptive behavior” 
subject to Section 5 enforcement includes those instances in which a com-
pany, in a privacy policy or otherwise, makes public representations about 
how it will or will not collect and use personal information and then turns 
around and violates this commitment.74  The FTC has brought dozens of de-
ception cases against companies that violated their own privacy policies or 
other public commitments.75  These actions have made it the nation’s leading 
privacy regulator.76  The FTC’s deceptiveness complaints support the control 
paradigm by holding companies to the representations they made to individ-
uals, and on which individuals relied in consenting to company’s processing 
of their data.  Coupled with privacy statutes’ notice and consent require-
ments, the FTC’s deceptiveness authority establishes the control paradigm as 
the dominant approach in traditional privacy law and policy. 
The control approach depends on two conditions, without which it can-
not function.  First, individuals must be able to detect when companies collect 
their data and understand how they will use it.  Only then can they make a 
meaningful choice about whether or not to allow this.  Second, companies 
must be able to know, at the time of collection, the purpose for which they 
are going to use data.  Only then can they notify individuals of this purpose 
and remain constrained by it.  In 1967, when Professor Alan Westin articu-
lated the control approach, most data processing met these conditions.77  
Companies generally collected personal data in manifest ways and for partic-
ular purposes.  Individuals could make a meaningful choice about whether to 
allow this.  Even as late as 1980, when the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development published its FIPPs, 
                                                          
have “played a significant role in framing privacy laws in the United States.” Rotenberg, supra note 
24, at 15; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 24, at viii. 
 71.  See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text. 
 72.  See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 73.  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
 74.  See Complaint at ¶¶ 17, 19, In re Snapchat, Inc., No. 132-3078, 2014 WL 1993567, at *3 
(F.T.C. May 8, 2014) (asserting that Snapchat’s violation of its privacy policy was subject to the 
FTC’s deceptiveness authority). 
 75.  Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600 (2014) (“The FTC has lodged just over 170 privacy-related com-
plaints since 1997, averaging about ten complaints per year.”); see, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 
570 F.3d 1187, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 2009) (bringing suit against a private company). 
 76.  Solove & Hartzog, supra note 75, at 585–86 (“FTC privacy jurisprudence has become the 
broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United States—more 
so than nearly any privacy statute or common law tort.”). 
 77.  “[E]xisting legal frameworks . . . date back from an era of mainframe computers, predating 
the Internet, mobile, and cloud computing.”  Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 241. 
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[b]usinesses and governments were . . . using personal data in 
more straightforward ways, often for a single, well-defined pur-
pose . . . . Under these circumstances, individuals were more likely 
to understand the purpose for which their data was being collected 
and used.  And ultimately they could be held accountable for sup-
plying informed consent when given adequate notice.78 
The digital revolution has made it much more difficult for individuals 
to achieve this understanding and make these choices.79  Today, “[d]ata are 
generated from online transactions, email, video, images, clickstream, logs, 
search queries, health records, and social networking interactions; gleaned 
from increasingly pervasive sensors deployed in infrastructure such as com-
munications networks, electric grids, global positioning satellites, roads and 
bridges, as well as in homes, clothing, and mobile phones.”80  Some of this 
data creation and collection crosses our awareness, but much does not.81  
Companies seek to give individuals more control over the processing of their 
data by posting privacy policies that explain their data practices and provide 
a means (usually opt-out)82 for individuals to choose whether to allow them.  
But the burden of actually reading such notices has become so overwhelming 
that most people are unable to keep up.83  Policymakers’ main response has 
been to try to make notice and choice more user-friendly and efficient.84 
For many, the need to protect privacy meant and continues to mean 
finding a way to support notice and choice . . . . As before, the chal-
lenge continues to be perceived as purely operational, as a more 
urgent need for new and inventive approaches to informing and 
consenting that truly map onto the states of understanding and as-
senting that give moral legitimacy to the practices in question.85 
                                                          
 78.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
 79.  Hartzog, supra note 12, at 953 (explaining that the shift from information in databases to 
more advanced information technologies renders inadequate control-based approaches like the Fair 
Information Practices.) 
 80.  Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 240.  
 81.  For example, companies can harvest data from publicly available records such as govern-
ment databases or from semi-public data sources such as publicly available Facebook information.  
Id. at 260. 
 82.  SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 829 (stating that many privacy policies contain 
an “opt-out” provision). 
 83.  Hartzog, supra note 21, at 428–29; Hartzog, supra note 12, at 973, 975; McDonald & 
Cranor, supra note 28, at 563–64 (noting that it would take 244 hours per year for an individual to 
read through all notices encountered online); Mundie, supra note 42, at 30. 
 84.  FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 49–50 (2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protect-
ing-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
 85.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 57–58; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 
445 (explaining that “new proposals remain rooted in the Control Illusion”). 
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The 2018 CONSENT Act86 demonstrates this propensity.  Proposed by 
Senators Blumenthal and Markey in response to the Facebook-Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, this bill would require “edge” providers such as Facebook 
to notify individuals of their collection and use of sensitive, personally iden-
tifiable information and proceed only if the person grants consent.87  To be 
sure, legislators and policymakers have looked to some newer approaches, 
such as privacy by design.88  But proposals such as the CONSENT Act, and 
the FTC’s continued reliance on its deceptiveness authority,89 make clear that 
the control paradigm remains the dominant policy response to the challenges 
posed by the digital economy. 
III.  BEYOND CONTROL 
It is time for something more protective.  The past dozen years have 
seen the rapid rise of predictive analytics—a means of analysis that both 
poses profound risks to individuals and evades the control paradigm’s at-
tempt to protect them. This Part describes predictive analytics and the bene-
fits—and harms—it generates.  It then explains why the control paradigm 
cannot protect people against these threats and so why a new regulatory par-
adigm is needed to run alongside the control approach and govern predictive 
analytics. 
A.  Predictive Analytics 
Eric Siegel defines predictive analytics as “[t]echnology that learns from 
experience (data) to predict the future behavior of individuals in order to 
drive better decisions.”90  To unpack this definition, it is helpful to start with 
an example.  Some years ago, a Canadian retailer wanted to identify its credit 
card holders who were likely to run up bills they could not pay and cut off 
their credit beforehand.91  The company had a massive set of data on existing 
card holders, their purchases, and whether they had defaulted on their pay-
ments.  It searched this data for a pattern.  Did individuals who defaulted on 
their credit card bills tend to purchase different items than those who dili-
gently paid off their balances?  The analysis revealed such a difference.  
                                                          
 86.  S. 2639, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 87.  Id. at § (2)(b)(2)(B); see also Alyson Sandler, Senate Democrats Propose CONSENT Act, 
INSIDE PRIVACY (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-states/congress/senate-
democrats-propose-consent-act/.  
 88.  FTC, supra note 84, at v.  
 89.  McSweeny, supra note 46, at 522 (concluding that “[f]or the most part, the FTC continues 
to rely primarily on its deception authority when policing consumer privacy and the use of consumer 
data”). 
 90.  SIEGEL, supra note 5, at 15. 
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Those who purchased chrome skull ornaments for the hood of their car or 
frequented pool halls were more likely to default on their credit card pay-
ments.92  Those who purchased furniture anti-scuff pads rarely defaulted.  
The company used this insight to inform its credit decisions.93 
This example illustrates well Siegel’s definition of predictive analytics.  
First, the credit card company identified a “target variable”—the attribute it 
was trying to predict, in this case a low risk of credit card default.  Next, it 
looked to its card holders’ purchasing histories.  Such “training data” often 
consists of massive data sets, such as those that the card companies possessed 
here, that contain the target variable as well as many other data points.  It 
analyzed the training data to find those items that correlated most closely 
with the target variable.  In this case, the strongest association was with fur-
niture anti-scuff pads.  Next, the company took that correlation, turned it into 
a profile, and applied it to individuals not in the original data set to predict 
whether they possessed the target variable (low risk of credit card default) or 
not.  Where the company saw the “proxy” for low default risk—the purchase 
of anti-scuff pads—it predicted that the target variable was likely to be pre-
sent as well.  Finally, the company acted on the prediction by marketing its 
cards to those who had purchased furniture anti-scuff pads.  Target variables, 
correlations, proxies, actionable predictions—these are the core features of 
predictive analytics. 
B.  The Benefits of Predictive Analytics 
Correlation-based prediction is not new.  What is new is the ability to 
make these predictions with tremendous precision, in real-time, and at scale.  
In the past dozen years or so, a number of factors have come together to in-
crease dramatically the power of predictive analytics.  While it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to describe them in detail, the main developments in-
clude: (1) the rapidly expanding amount of digital information being gener-
ated and collected;94 (2) the precipitously decreasing cost of collecting and 
storing that information;95 (3) the exponential growth in processing power, 
as identified in Moore’s Law;96 and (4) the emergence of “new computational 
                                                          
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  See SIEGEL, supra note 5, at 5; MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 39, at 9; 
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 9, at 3 n.1; Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 77; Tene & Polo-
netsky, supra note 6, at 240. 
 95.  MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 39, at 101 (explaining that, due to techno-
logical advances, costs of collection and recordation have dropped significantly, and the cost of 
digital storage has dropped by roughly fifty percent every two years for the last fifty years); SIEGEL, 
supra note 5, at 6.  
 96.  Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 77 (describing “the use of high speed, high-transfer rate com-
puters, coupled with petabytes (i[.]e[.] millions of gigabytes) of storage capacity, resulting in cheap 
and efficient data processing”); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 240 (attributing the rise of big 
data analytics to the “reduced costs of storing information and moving it around in conjunction with 
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frameworks (such as Apache Hadoop) for storing and analy[z]ing this huge 
volume of data.”97  Together, these technological developments enable data 
scientists to analyze massive quantities of data in real time to identify a com-
plex string of items that, if found together, predict an individual’s attributes—
pregnancy status, likelihood of disease, personality type, etc.—with great 
precision.  An algorithm is defined as “a step-by-step procedure for solving 
a problem or accomplishing some end”98 and is frequently characterized by 
if/then statements.  The string of proxies that, if found together, predict the 
presence of the target variable are often referred to as an algorithm. 
Predictive analytics can be used for great good.  It can improve health 
and save lives, make education more effective, make businesses more pro-
ductive and efficient, and produce many other improvements and benefits.99  
Many businesses and economic sectors have adopted predictive analytics in 
the past dozen years or so, making it increasingly central to our economy and 
to our lives.100  Some have gone so far as to identify the “big data economy” 
as a new economic form that will characterize and inform our society for 
years to come.101 
C.  Harms from Predictive Analytics 
Unfortunately, predictive analytics can also injure people in significant 
ways.102  While many have remarked on this, few have teased out and cate-
gorized these threats or assessed whether the control paradigm can success-
fully address them.103  The harms fall into four main categories: privacy in-
vasion, manipulation, bias, and procedural unfairness.104 
                                                          
increased capacity to instantly analyze heaps of unstructured data using modern experimental meth-
ods, observational and longitudinal studies, and large scale simulations”).  
 97.  Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 77. 
 98.  Algorithm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/algorithm 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2019); see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide 
to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 23 (2017) (defining an algorithm as “a step-
by-step process”). 
 99.  Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 241, 247.  
 100.  See Terence Mills, Eight Ways Big Data and AI Are Changing The Business World, 
FORBES (July 31, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07/31/eight-ways-
big-data-and-ai-are-changing-the-business-world/#5e18915d45b6.  
 101.  SIEGEL, supra note 5, at xxi (explaining that “[m]ore and more, predictive analytics (PA) 
drives commerce, manufacturing, healthcare, government, and law enforcement”). 
 102.  See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 44; Hirsch, supra note 7, at 4. 
 103.  One helpful formulation is from the Future of Privacy Forum.  FUTURE OF PRIVACY 
FORUM, UNFAIRNESS BY ALGORITHM: DISTILLING THE HARMS OF AUTOMATED DECISION-
MAKING (2017), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/FPF-Automated-Decision-Making-
Harms-and-Mitigation-Charts.pdf.  
 104.  Hirsch, supra note 7, at 4–9 (elaborating on these four categories of harm). 
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1.  Privacy Invasion 
Predictive analytics takes surface data (like purchase of furniture anti-
scuff pads) and infers latent data from it (like credit card default risk).  This 
may be why some refer to predictive analytics as “data mining”105—it un-
earths and reveals hidden information that lies below the surface.  This in-
ferred, latent data can be highly sensitive.  For example, as explained above, 
Target predicted which of its female customers were likely to be pregnant 
and inadvertently disclosed this fact to one girl’s father.106  Disclosure of 
pregnancy status or other sensitive information that the data subject does not 
wish to reveal is a classic privacy violation.107 
In another example, researchers at Cambridge University were able to 
predict a person’s gender, sexuality, age, race, and political affiliation “[w]ith 
remarkable accuracy” based solely on their Facebook likes.108  As one of 
those researchers, computational psychologist and big data scientist Michal 
Kozinski, concluded in a published study: 
 With just 10 likes, a computer model fundamentally knows you 
better than a colleague . . . . With 70 likes, it knows you better than 
a friend or roommate; with 150 likes, better than a family member.  
And with 300 likes, Big Data knows you better than your spouse.109 
Cambridge Analytica (not formally associated with Cambridge University) 
drew on the Cambridge researchers’ approach to infer 87 million Facebook 
users’ personality types and target them with political advertisements that 
they would find hard to resist.110 
Purchases at Target, Facebook likes, and the sensitive information that 
data scientists can infer from them are just the tip of the iceberg.  Each of us 
generates copious data through our online interactions, smart phones, social 
                                                          
 105.  See Robert Sprague, Welcome to the Machine: Privacy and Workplace Implications of 
Predictive Analytics, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, 13 (2015) (referencing “predictive analytics” and 
“data mining”). 
 106.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 107.  See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, at 55, 476; Hirsch, supra note 7, at 4. 
 108.  Rebecca J. Rosen, Armed With Facebook ‘Likes’ Alone, Researchers Can Tell Your Race, 
Gender, and Sexual Orientation, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/technol-
ogy/archive/2013/03/armed-with-facebook-likes-alone-researchers-can-tell-your-race-gender-and-
sexual-orientation/273963/.  
 109.  Ben Tinker, How Facebook “Likes” Predict Race, Religion and Sexual Orientation, CNN 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/10/health/facebook-likes-psychographics/in-
dex.html.  
 110.  Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Says Cambridge Analytica Harvested Data of 
up to 87 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technol-
ogy/mark-zuckerberg-testify-congress.html (stating the number of Facebook users involved); Mat-
thew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-
trump-campaign.html (describing how Cambridge Analytica used Facebook likes to infer personal-
ity types). 
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media accounts, internet-connected appliances, etc.  From this information, 
data scientists can infer our most sensitive characteristics and vulnerabili-
ties—our health conditions, sexual preferences, religious beliefs, political 
commitments—and, if they wish, share these insights with others, all without 
consulting us, much less getting our consent.  Predictive analytics thus poses 
a profound threat to personal privacy.111 
2.  Manipulation 
Predictive analytics can reveal people’s hidden attributes and vulnera-
bilities and so can make them vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation.  
For example, a bad actor might take consumer data, infer from it which par-
ticular individuals are likely to be suffering from early stage dementia, and 
then target them with predatory loans.  Or, to take the real world example 
mentioned above, a company such as Cambridge Analytica might take peo-
ples’ Facebook “likes,” use them to infer their personality types, and then 
target them with political advertisements that they will find hard to resist.112  
The difficult questions with respect to manipulation lie in identifying the 
point at which socially acceptable marketing becomes unacceptable manipu-
lation.  An important body of scholarship is beginning to examine this ques-
tion and suggest ways to draw these lines.113  Any regulatory system that 
seeks to reduce the predictive analytics’ threats will need to have a method 
for doing so. 
3.  Bias 
Anti-discrimination law distinguishes between claims of disparate treat-
ment and claims of disparate impact.  Disparate treatment exists when one 
intentionally disadvantages others on the basis of their protected class sta-
tus.114  Disparate impact occurs when a facially neutral standard unintention-
ally, but meaningfully, disadvantages people on the basis of their protected 
class status.115  Predictive analytics can produce both types of bias.  With 
                                                          
 111.  Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 77. 
 112.  Rosenberg et al., supra note 110 (describing how Cambridge Analytica used Facebook 
likes to infer personality types).  
 113.  See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 998 (2014); 
Ido Kovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449 (2019); Daniel Susser 
et al., Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2019); 
Tal Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 157 (2019). 
 114.  45C AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 2395 (2012) (stating that “[u]nder a disparate treat-
ment theory, employment discrimination occurs where an employer has treated a particular person 
less favorably than others because of a protected trait”); see Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1977). 
 115.  9 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. 3d § 11856 (2018) (stating that under a disparate impact 
theory, a plaintiff must show “that the recipient used a facially neutral practice that had a dispropor-
tionate impact on a group protected by Title VI”); see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 
U.S. 977, 987–88 (1988); Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. 
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respect to disparate treatment, a company could use predictive analytics to 
infer someone’s membership in a protected class (like the class of pregnant 
women), and then intentionally discriminate against the person on this ba-
sis.116 
Disparate impact discrimination can occur when existing bias has 
shaped the training data.117  For example, as mentioned briefly above, Ama-
zon tried to use predictive analytics to evaluate the tens of thousands of re-
sumes it receives.118  It began with the resumes of past applicants and looked 
for a pattern—which resume attributes correlated closely with being hired at 
the company, and which did not?  The analysis determined that resume items 
associated with being a woman (like attending an all-female college or being 
a member of the Women’s Chess Club) were associated with unsuccessful 
applications.  The algorithm thus learned to screen out women’s resumes.  
This very likely resulted, not from these women being any less capable, but 
rather from the documented pro-male bias in the technology industry that had 
shaped training data—the resumes of successful and unsuccessful job appli-
cants—that the data scientists employed to look for correlations.119 
Amazon discovered this problem before implementing the predictive 
tool.120  Had it not done so, the algorithm trained on biased data would have 
reproduced and perpetuated this bias and done so with the veneer of machine 
objectivity.  As predictive analytics becomes more and more central to eligi-
bility determinations of many types (employment, credit, insurance, school 
admissions, etc.), harmful bias may be the most significant threat that it cre-
ates. 
4.  Procedural Unfairness 
Predictive analytics can produce errors when either the algorithm, or the 
data to which a company applies the algorithm, is faulty.  But human deci-
sionmakers, too, make mistakes.  The real problem with algorithmic errors 
lies in the opacity of the decision-making process and its imperviousness to 
                                                          
 116.  Such a practice would likely violate employment discrimination laws but would be very 
hard to detect.  See, e.g., The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, amending Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (prohibiting an employer from discriminating 
against an employee or applicant based on pregnancy status). 
 117.  Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 
674 (2016); Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy and It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 35, 37 (2013); Tal Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 1375, 1389 (2014). 
 118.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 119.  Amazon Ditched AI Recruiting Tool That Favored Men for Technical Jobs, GUARDIAN 
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/10/amazon-hiring-ai-gender-
bias-recruiting-engine (noting the pro-male bias in tech companies). 
 120.  Id. 
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challenge.  For example, where a predictive algorithm determines that an em-
ployee would not succeed in a higher position, and the company accordingly 
denies him a promotion,121 the employee in question would have no way to 
know what data or algorithm resulted in this determination and no way to 
challenge it.122  Such algorithmic determinations are a “black box” as far as 
the individual is concerned.123  The risk to the individual, then, is that ma-
chine-driven decisions deny people the core procedural rights—transparency 
and the right to be heard—to which they are entitled when others are making 
important decisions about their lives. 
In sum, predictive analytics poses risks of privacy invasion, manipula-
tion, bias (both of the disparate treatment and disparate impact varieties) and 
procedural unfairness.  This is not an exhaustive list.  But these are four of 
the main risks that predictive analytics presents and show that, along with its 
many benefits, predictive analytics can create some very real harms. The 
challenge is how to protect people from these threats. 
D.  The Viability of the Control Paradigm 
The control paradigm of notice, consent, and purpose limitation does 
not sufficiently protect people from the predictive analytics’ harms.124  Most 
people do not understand that predictive analytics takes surface data (e.g., 
purchase histories) and infers latent information (e.g., pregnancy status) and 
so cannot make a meaningful choice as to whether to share the surface data 
in the first place.125  The situation is not unlike the renter of an apartment who 
may be able to see the walls and floors and appliances—the information on 
the surface—but cannot evaluate the heating and electrical systems.126  Just 
as it makes no sense to apply caveat lessee to such a person, it makes no sense 
to apply the control paradigm to someone who cannot understand what infor-
mation they are really disclosing. 
The second reason the control paradigm cannot protect people today is 
that the companies that use predictive analytics frequently do not know, at 
                                                          
 121.  Jeffrey T. Polzer, Case Study: Should an Algorithm Tell You Who to Promote?, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/02/case-study-should-an-algorithm-tell-you-who-
to-promote.  
 122.  Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 77–78 (“Because decisions based on data mining are largely 
invisible to their subjects, significant issues arise around access to, and the accuracy and reliability 
of, the underlying data.”). 
 123.  FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 14, 17–18, 218 (2016). 
 124.  McSweeny, supra note 46, at 518 (explaining that notice and choice does not adequately 
protect people against “unanticipated uses of data as inputs for complex algorithms”). 
 125.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 6 (stating that given “the proliferation of new information 
technologies, applications, and data uses, individual consent is rarely exercised as a meaningful 
choice”); Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 78 (“[S]ince users lack knowledge of potential correlations, 
they cannot knowingly consent to the use of their data for data mining or Big Data analytics.”). 
 126.  See supra, notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
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the time of collection, the purpose for which they will use a particular piece 
of data.  Companies do not determine the purpose until after they analyze the 
data set and identify the proxies.127  It follows that, at the time that they col-
lect data, companies that employ predictive analytics generally do not know, 
and so cannot provide notice of, the specific purpose for which they will use 
the data.128  “[F]irms that rely on data mining may find it impossible to pro-
vide adequate notice for the simple reason that they do not (and cannot) know 
in advance what they may discover.”129 
Predictive analytics thus undermines both of the preconditions of the 
control paradigm.  It prevents individuals from understanding what they are 
really disclosing to companies, and it makes it far more difficult for compa-
nies to know and disclose in advance the purpose for which they will use 
these data.  In so doing, predictive analytics prevents people from making 
meaningful choices about whether to disclose their surface information and 
so fundamentally undermines the control paradigm of privacy law. 
The control approach cannot protect people from the threats that predic-
tive analytics poses.  It cannot empower people to protect their privacy be-
cause, when people agree to share data, they do not know what they are really 
revealing.  The control approach cannot enable people to protect themselves 
against manipulation because they often do not know when they are revealing 
their vulnerabilities.  The control approach cannot protect against bias be-
cause, while companies may provide notice that they are going to use per-
sonal data for analytic purposes, they do not give access to the training data 
or the algorithm and, even if they did, most people would not know how to 
assess them. 
                                                          
 127.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 60 (explaining that providing notice in the big 
data context is “challenging, almost by definition, because the value of big data lies in the unexpect-
edness of the insights that it can reveal”); Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 76 (stating that predictive 
analytics produces newly discovered information that is unintuitive and unpredictable); Tene & 
Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 261 (“Moreover, to be meaningful, consent must be specific to the 
purpose (or context).  Yet by its very nature, big data analysis seeks surprising correlations and 
produces results that resist prediction.”).  
 128.  A company could, perhaps, notify individuals that it was going to analyze their purchase 
data so as better to market the company’s goods or to improve services or for one of the other very 
broad “purposes” that companies sometimes state.  But this would tell the purchaser little about how 
their data was going to be used and how this might affect them.  It would not allow the purchaser to 
protect themselves.  
 129.  Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 78; see also CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 8 (explaining that 
“the context in which personal information will be used and the value it will hold are often unclear 
at the time of collection”); Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 60 (big data makes notice and 
consent difficult because, “[w]ith the best of intentions, holders of large datasets willing to submit 
them to analyses unguided by explicit hypotheses may discover correlations that they had not sought 
in advance or anticipated”). 
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The control paradigm does provide some tools to address procedural 
unfairness.  Both the FIPPs,130 and U.S. statutes that implement them,131 grant 
individuals the right to access the personal information that a company holds 
about them, and to correct inaccuracies.  Access and correction rights provide 
some of the transparency and technological due process that people need if 
they are to contest to algorithmic eligibility determinations that govern their 
life opportunities (jobs, credit, insurance, etc.).  But the FIPPs do not go 
nearly far enough.  They enable an individual only to check and correct their 
own data, not the entire set of training data on which the algorithm is based.  
And they do not give them the right to check the algorithm itself to see if it 
is biased or otherwise faulty.  Even with respect to the particular proxy data 
point that determines a person’s eligibility for goods or opportunities, access 
and correction rights will not be sufficient because individuals, who do not 
have access to the algorithm, will not know the significance of this data point.  
Given this, most people will lack an incentive to correct it.  Who knew that 
the purchase of furniture anti-scuff pads was relevant to anything other than 
stopping one’s floors from getting scratched?132  No one.  And so no one 
would have an incentive to check on and correct this data point. 
For all of these reasons, regulation premised on individual control can-
not protect us in a world that is beyond our control.133  “[I]nformed consent 
is a useful privacy measure in certain circumstances and against certain 
threats . . . but, against the challenges of big data, consent, by itself, has little 
traction.”134  If the law is to protect people from the threats of predictive an-
alytics—and it must—it needs a new regulatory paradigm with which to do 
so.135 
IV.  NEW PARADIGMS FOR PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 
A new legal and regulatory paradigm should have two core features.  
First, it should emphasize social protection, rather than individual control.  In 
                                                          
 130.  Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. [OECD], Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, ¶13 (2013) (describing the “Individual Participation Princi-
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 131.  See, e.g., Cable Communications Policy Act § 631(d), 47 U.S.C. § 551(d) (2012) (requiring 
cable operators to provide subscribers with “access to all personally identifiable information regard-
ing that subscriber . . . [and a] reasonable opportunity to correct any error in such information”). 
 132.  See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
 133.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 6–7; Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 45; Rubin-
stein, supra note 10, at 78–79; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 6, at 242.  
 134.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 58. 
 135.  Rubinstein, supra note 10, at 74 (“My contention is that when this advancing wave arrives, 
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other words, it must shift from a liberalist regulatory approach that seeks to 
facilitate individual choice, to one that empowers public officials to make 
choices about which predictive analytics practices are safe for individuals 
and consistent with social values and which are not.136  This is the same shift 
that legislatures and courts made when they moved from caveat lessee to the 
implied warranty of habitability.137  In the case of caveat lessee, as in the case 
of privacy, technology evolved to the point that individuals could no longer 
make meaningful choices and so could no longer protect themselves through 
their market decisions.  In such situations, the liberalist approach to regula-
tion, which seeks to bolster individual choice, must give way to a more inter-
ventionist one.  Where people cannot protect themselves, society should take 
steps to protect them. 
This shift need not be complete.  Where people can still understand what 
data they are sharing and how they will be used, the liberalist presumption 
requires that the regulatory system seek to support individual, market choices 
about these matters.138  But where people can no longer make meaningful 
choices then, by definition, it makes no sense to provide them with the ap-
pearance of a choice.139  In such situations, legislators and courts should shift 
from requiring notice and choice to setting substantive rules about which pre-
dictive analytics practices are acceptable, and which are not.  When it comes 
to predictive analytics, policy needs to shift from the control paradigm to a 
“protection paradigm.” 
For its second core feature, the new paradigm must be able to protect 
people against the whole panoply of predictive analytics risks: privacy, ma-
nipulation, harmful bias, and procedural unfairness.  The big data economy 
is a new phenomenon that poses new risks and the law must address these 
threats.  If the new paradigm can meet these two criteria—if it can draw sub-
stantive lines between those predictive analytics practices that are socially 
acceptable and those that are not and can do so in a way that protects people 
against privacy, manipulation, bias, and procedural unfairness harms—then 
it has a chance of protecting people in the algorithmic economy. 
Legislators, such as those who proposed the CONSENT Act, seem pre-
occupied with the control paradigm and are slow to see its limitations or to 
move beyond it.140  Academics, however, have been quicker to identify the 
                                                          
 136.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 45–46 (explaining that, given the rise of predic-
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cussing how notice and consent can still work for smart meters); Hartzog, supra note 12, at 954. 
 139.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 58.  
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control paradigm’s shortcomings in the era of predictive analytics.141  Several 
have identified the need for a new regulatory paradigm for reasons similar to 
those just outlined.142  They have developed interesting proposals for what 
this new paradigm should look like. 
Professors Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain (in an argument that reso-
nates with the work of Professors Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog143) 
propose that certain data-rich companies be treated as “information fiduciar-
ies” and held to duties of care and loyalty in their interactions with their us-
ers.144  Professors Helen Nissenbaum and Solon Barocas maintain that “con-
textual integrity” theory can provide a conceptual framework for drawing the 
lines between socially acceptable and unacceptable predictive analytics ap-
plications.145  Professor Fred Cate, Professor Victor Mayer-Schönberger, and 
Peter Cullen146 and, writing separately, Craig Mundie, recommend that reg-
ulation focus less on the collection and storage of personal data, and more on 
how companies use it.147  Professors Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale and, 
writing separately, Professors Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz call for a new 
regulatory framework grounded in due process norms.148 
This body of work is not often spoken of in the same breath.  But it 
should be.  Each of these authors recognizes that the control paradigm of 
privacy law cannot adequately protect people in today’s digital economy.149  
Each suggests a way to fill this gap.150  Their collective search for a new 
regulatory paradigm to address the threats that predictive analytics poses is 
                                                          
 141.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 58 (“While the idea that informed consent itself 
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one of the most exciting areas of privacy law and policy scholarship today.  
Together with others writing on this topic,151 these scholars are creating a 
new field focused on the law and policy of predictive analytics.152  The rest 
of this Part describes and evaluates the proposals. 
A.  Information Fiduciaries 
Privacy law, which seeks to limit the disclosure and use of personal in-
formation, and the First Amendment, which seeks to assure its free transmis-
sion, can be in tension.153  A noted First Amendment scholar, Professor Jack 
Balkin starts with the idea that any new data protection approach must be 
able to survive a First Amendment challenge.  He frames his influential arti-
cle, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,154 as an attempt to 
harmonize privacy regulation with the First Amendment.155 
Balkin focuses on an important exception to the First Amendment: fi-
duciary duties of loyalty and of care.156  Such duties can require a lawyer or 
doctor, for example, to use a client’s or patient’s personal data only in ways 
that benefit that person and to obtain the client’s or patient’s consent before 
doing so.157  Such restrictions do not offend the First Amendment. 
Balkin employs this exception to craft a policy proposal that could, con-
sistent with the First Amendment, put substantive constraints on some com-
mercial data practices.  He points out that social media platforms, search en-
gines, and certain other online service providers resemble fiduciaries.158  
Much like lawyers or doctors, these service providers receive sensitive per-
sonal information they are expected to treat with care and use to further the 
data subject’s interests.  Balkin calls online service providers “information 
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fiduciaries” and argues that the law could, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, impose on them duties of care and loyalty.159  These duties would ex-
tend to the information fiduciary’s use of predictive analytics to make deci-
sions about people.160  In a separate, significant article, Professors Neil 
Richards and Woodrow Hartzog also look to fiduciary law as a model for 
privacy regulation.161  This analysis will focus on Professor Balkin’s work, 
but much of it would apply to Professors Richards and Hartzog’s important 
proposal as well. 
Fiduciary duties are substantive obligations that go well beyond notice, 
choice, and purpose limitation.  They seek, not to give individuals control 
over their personal information, but to impose substantive limits on the fidu-
ciary’s actions with respect to this data.  In this way, Balkin’s proposal satis-
fies the first requirement of the new regulatory paradigm—that it create sub-
stantive rules that draw the line between algorithmic activities that are 
socially acceptable, and those that are not.  The “duty of care” obliges fidu-
ciaries to “take care to act competently and diligently so as not to harm the 
interests of the principal, beneficiary, or client.”162  The “duty of loyalty” 
requires them to “keep their clients’ interests in mind” and, where the fiduci-
ary’s interests might conflict with the clients’, always to “act in their clients’ 
interests.”163  Balkin recommends that Congress pass legislation imposing 
these obligations on online service providers.  This, he maintains, would cre-
ate substantive limits on commercial data practices and help to protect indi-
viduals in today’s digital economy. 
In a subsequent article published in The Atlantic and titled A Grand Bar-
gain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy, Professor Balkin and Professor 
Jonathan Zittrain call for a federal statute that would give tech companies the 
option of taking on these fiduciary duties with respect to their users.164  Such 
companies would agree to “the duty to use personal data in ways that don’t 
betray end users and harm them.”165  In exchange, the statute would pre-empt 
the “patchwork of state and local laws about online privacy” that such com-
panies find burdensome and difficult to comply with.166  This “grand bargain” 
                                                          
 159.  Id. at 1209 (“An information fiduciary is a person or business who, because of their rela-
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 160.  Id. at 1232.  
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could create business support for such legislation and so facilitate its pas-
sage.167 
Professor Balkin’s information fiduciary idea proposal contains the two 
required features.  It imposes substantive obligations—the duty of care and 
the duty of loyalty—on online service providers.  And it reaches beyond pri-
vacy harms to encompass predictive analytics’ other risks.  Fiduciary duties 
“include duties not to use information obtained in the course of the relation-
ship in ways that harm or undermine the principal, patient, or client, or create 
conflicts of interest with the principal, patient, or client.”168  This broad lim-
itation should prevent, not just privacy injuries, but also manipulation, bias, 
and procedural unfairness, each of which could harm or undermine the indi-
vidual.  By casting the obligations as fiduciary duties, Balkin’s proposal ob-
viates any potential First Amendment obstacle to substantive limits of this 
type.169 
For all of its advantages, Balkin’s proposal will not protect people suf-
ficiently from the risks of predictive analytics.  To begin with, the proposal’s 
scope is too narrow.  It covers only those “information fiduciaries” who 
“[b]ecause of their special power over others and their special relationships 
to others, . . . have special duties to act in ways that do not harm the interests 
of the people whose information they collect, analyze, use, sell, and distrib-
ute.”170  It does not cover the large number of digital businesses that have no 
such direct relationships with individuals.  This is an important gap.  Increas-
ingly, companies use predictive analytics to make eligibility determina-
tions171 for marketing offers, jobs, loans, insurance, housing, and other vital 
goods and life opportunities.172  This aspect of the algorithmic economy—
what Professors Citron and Pasquale have called “technology-driven adjudi-
cation”173—constitutes one of the most significant forums in which privacy 
violations, bias, procedural unfairness, and manipulation can rear their ugly 
heads.  A new paradigm for regulating predictive analytics must cover this 
situation and prevent these harms. 
Professors Balkin and Zittrain’s information fiduciaries model would 
not.  Generally, the companies making these eligibility determinations do not 
have a relationship with the individual at the time the person applies for the 
loan, job, insurance, housing, or other good—the critical moment at which 
predictive analytics can work its harm.  Without such a relationship, these 
companies will not meet Balkin’s definition of information fiduciary and will 
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not be covered by his proposed law.174  Professor Balkin’s proposal thus 
leaves out the very companies that can do the most damage: those that em-
ploy predictive analytics to make eligibility determinations.  Balkin recog-
nizes this limitation: 
[T]he analysis I have offered in this essay can only take us so far.  
The concept of information fiduciaries presented here focuses on 
the violations of special relationships between companies and the 
people whose information they collect, collate, and use. . . .  But in 
the Algorithmic Society, companies will purchase and use lots of 
data that is not so encumbered, and they will use it to affect the 
lives of countless people who are not their clients or end-users.   
 At this point, we can no longer rely on the notion of special fidu-
ciary relationships between individuals and companies to regulate 
the use and abuse of data.175 
Even if information fiduciary theory were able to overcome this scope 
limitation and establish a relationship between the company and the individ-
ual, the duties of care and loyalty that the theory prescribes would not be 
appropriate for large swaths of the algorithmic economy.176  Consider a com-
pany that utilizes predictive analytics to determine which of its existing em-
ployees to interview for a promotion to a higher-level job.  The algorithm 
evaluates Ed Employee, predicts that he would not perform well in the new 
position, and so the company does not consider him for it.177  Under infor-
mation fiduciary theory, the company would just have violated the duty of 
loyalty.178  That is, it would have put its own interests ahead of the data sub-
ject’s interests.179  But prioritizing the employer’s needs is just what society 
would expect and want the employer to do when selecting someone for a 
promotion. 
                                                          
 174.  Balkin, supra note 40, at 1232–33 (recognizing that, “when algorithms use data about other 
people,” there is no violation of a fiduciary relationship). 
 175.  Id. at 1233. 
 176.  Professors Richards and Hartzog take a slightly more nuanced approach.  While they call 
for making the duty of loyalty “a foundational concept in privacy law,” Richards & Hartzog, supra 
note 11, at 468, they define the duty more narrowly and argue that the law should regulate “unrea-
sonable self-dealing.”  Id. at 471.  However, they do not explain how to draw the line between 
reasonable, and unreasonable, self-dealing.  
 177.  This is the field of “people analytics” and is much used in business today.  Carla Arellano 
et al., Using People Analytics to Drive Business Performance: A Case Study, MCKINSEY & CO. 
(July 2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/using-
people-analytics-to-drive-business-performance-a-case-study.  
 178.  Balkin, supra note 40, at 1209 (explaining that information fiduciaries have a duty “to use 
the information they obtain about their clients for the client’s benefit and not to use the information 
to the client’s disadvantage”). 
 179.  Id. 
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This example highlights an important limitation on the information fi-
duciary approach: Fiduciary duties are not designed to apply to all compa-
nies.  They are designed for those commercial actors, such as lawyers, doc-
tors, or accountants, whose very function requires them to put their clients’ 
interests ahead of their own.  They do not apply, and should not apply, to the 
great majority of commercial actors who, with limited exceptions,180 are ex-
pected to pursue their own self-interest.  Society requires such companies to 
deal fairly and honestly with others.  But it does not demand that they behave 
like a fiduciary.  This further limits the usefulness of Professor Balkin’s ap-
proach when it comes to governing the algorithmic economy.  Cameron 
Kerry’s interesting proposal for a “Golden Rule of Privacy,” under which 
those entrusted with another’s personal information would have “the obliga-
tion to act in the interests of the beneficiaries and to avoid self-dealing,” is 
similar in many ways to Professor Balkin’s fiduciary duties and suffers from 
this same limitation.181 
Another issue with the information fiduciary model is that beneficiaries 
can often consent to the disclosure of their information by a fiduciary who 
might otherwise have a duty to keep it confidential.  Thus, the information 
fiduciary approach does not fully free us from the consent problem. 
The final problem with Professor Balkin’s proposal is that it would re-
quire congressional action.  While Balkin and Zittrain make an interesting 
case for why members of Congress and tech companies should support such 
a statute, getting legislation through Congress remains an uphill climb.  An-
alytics-based eligibility determinations are being made today that will have 
lasting effects.  People need regulatory protections now. 
B.  Contextual Integrity 
In their illuminating book chapter, Big Data’s End Run Around Ano-
nymity and Consent, Professors Helen Nissenbaum and Solon Barocas offer 
an alternative regulatory framework for predictive analytics,182 one grounded 
in Nissenbaum’s highly influential theory of contextual integrity.183  Like 
Professor Balkin in his Information Fiduciaries piece184 and this Article,185 
Professors Nissenbaum and Barocas recognize that notice, consent, and the 
other elements of the control paradigm do not protect people sufficiently 
                                                          
 180.  For example, they cannot discriminate against protected classes even if they believe that 
doing so would further their own interests. 
 181.  Cameron F. Kerry, Why Protecting Privacy Is a Losing Game Today—and How to Change 
the Game, BROOKINGS (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protecting-pri-
vacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/.  
 182.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10. 
 183.  HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY 
OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010). 
 184.  See supra notes 154–167 and accompanying text. 
 185.  See supra Part II. 
 
2020] FROM INDIVIDUAL CONTROL TO SOCIAL PROTECTION 469 
from the harms of predictive analytics.186  If individual choice is not to estab-
lish limits on this type of data processing, what should take its place? 
Nissenbaum and Barocas develop a two-part answer.  First, the infor-
mational norms that surround the collection and use of particular pieces of 
information should limit business activities with respect to this data.  People 
generally share information in a particular context (e.g., a professional office 
or a friendship).  Social norms specific to that setting govern these data 
flows.187  Business use of predictive analytics that accords with these context-
specific norms is presumptively appropriate; that which does not, is presump-
tively inappropriate.188  In this way, social norms provide a basis for drawing 
substantive lines between acceptable and unacceptable applications of pre-
dictive analytics. 
This cannot be the end of the inquiry, however.  Norms change in re-
sponse to evolving social conditions and technologies.189  In their day, 
Brandeis and Warren were outraged by the emergence of the “snap” camera 
that could take photos in an instant.190  Today, we accept such cameras with-
out a second thought.  A legal regime that outlaws all data practices incon-
sistent with existing informational norms would impede the process by which 
new technologies, including those highly beneficial to humanity, are intro-
duced and norms change.  Professors Nissenbaum and Barocas’s commit-
ment to informational norms thus creates a problem for their theory. 
To save the contextual integrity theory, they must identify a way to dis-
tinguish norm-breaking data practices that are legitimate and acceptable, 
from those that are not.191  Nissenbaum and Barocas articulate a way to draw 
this line.  Data practices that transgress informational norms are permissible 
where they are “more effective in promoting interests, general moral and po-
litical values, and context-specific ends, purposes, and values” such as “fair-
ness, justice, freedom, autonomy, welfare, and others more specific to the 
context in question,” than those practices that comply with existing informa-
tional norms.192  Data practices that are not more effective at doing so are 
impermissible. 
                                                          
 186.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 45 (explaining that “[i]n practice, . . . anonymity 
and consent have proven elusive, as time and again critics have revealed fundamental problems in 
implementing both”). 
 187.  Id. at 47. 
 188.  “Entrenched norms” are the default.  Id. at 48. 
 189.  Id. at 47. 
 190.  See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 54, at 195 (“Instantaneous photographs and newspaper 
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life . . . .”). 
 191.  Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 10, at 47 (“To explain why such disruptions are morally 
problematic—or rather to distinguish between those that are and are not—a norm-based account of 
privacy, such as contextual integrity, must offer a basis for drawing such distinctions.”). 
 192.  Id. at 48.  “For the theory of contextual integrity, the touchstones of moral legitimacy in-
clude interests and general moral and political values (and associated rights), commonly cited in 
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Nissenbaum and Barocas’s approach thus requires two steps.  First, ask 
whether a particular data flow is consistent with context-specific, existing 
informational norms.  If so, the data flow is presumptively legitimate; if not, 
it is presumptively illegitimate.  Second, ask whether the data practice that 
transgresses existing informational norms promotes moral, political and con-
text-specific values such as “fairness, justice, freedom, autonomy, welfare, 
and others more specific to the context in question” better than existing, 
norm-compliant practices.193  If so, this can rebut the presumption and render 
the new data practice legitimate and appropriate, notwithstanding the fact that 
it breaks existing informational norms.  Professors Nissenbaum and Barocas 
phrase it in this way: “a heuristic supported by contextual integrity sets en-
trenched norms as default but allows that if novel practices are more effective 
in promoting interests, general moral and political values, and context-
specific ends, purposes, and values, they should be favored over the status 
quo.”194 
Contextual integrity theory does important work with respect to the reg-
ulation of predictive analytics.  Rather than rely on the illusion of individual 
control, it draws a substantive line between data practices that are appropriate 
and those that are not.  It further highlights existing informational norms as 
important points of reference for making this determination. 
But it is less helpful when it comes to deciding whether predictive ana-
lytics practices that break with social norms (which will likely be most such 
operations, given the newness of the field and the premium that it places on 
innovation) are nonetheless appropriate and acceptable.  To determine 
whether such practices are acceptable, the theory would require one to assess 
whether the norm-breaking analytic practice is better able to promote “inter-
ests, general moral and political values, and context-specific ends, purposes, 
and values” such as “fairness, justice, freedom, autonomy, welfare, and oth-
ers more specific to the context in question,” than a norm-compliant one 
would be.195  This test is so vague as to be almost unworkable.  Which general 
and context-specific interests and values is one to consider?  Professors Nis-
senbaum and Barocas point us to certain values—fairness, justice, freedom, 
autonomy, welfare.  But each of these grand concepts carries with it a lengthy 
intellectual history and is highly contestable.  And who is to say that Nissen-
baum and Barocas have even arrived at the right list?  Might there be other 
values capable of overriding existing informational norms such as “family” 
or “democracy” or any number of other highly important values? 
                                                          
accounts of privacy.  Beyond these, however, a further distinctive set of considerations are context-
specific ends, purposes, and values.”  Id. at 47–48. 
 193.  Id. at 48. 
 194.  Id.  
 195.  Id. 
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Assuming that the values themselves were clear and uncontestable, the 
decisionmaker would still face the problem of deciding whether the data 
practice in question would further these values better than alternative prac-
tices that are consistent with existing informational norms.  This would re-
quire the decisionmaker to define the operative values (“fairness, justice, 
freedom, autonomy,” etc.) and then make a judgment about how they apply 
to a given context.  Each of these steps is difficult and subjective.  How is 
one to define clearly “freedom” or “justice” or “autonomy”?  And how is one 
to know, with sufficient certainty, whether a given analytic innovation will 
further these worthy goals?  Professors Nissenbaum and Barocas themselves 
acknowledge that “since the world is a messy place, rife with conflict and 
uncertainty, it is usually on the basis of partial knowledge only that we seek 
to optimize on these factors.”196  The contextual integrity approach to predic-
tive analytics suffers from excessive vagueness and ambiguity. 
It also pays insufficient attention to political legitimacy.  Whose concept 
of freedom, or justice, or autonomy is to govern here?  The regulator’s?  A 
philosopher’s (which one)?  The company’s own vision?  Constitutional de-
mocracies have a way of settling contested values questions.  To state the 
obvious, they hold elections and then let the elected representatives and those 
to whom they delegate power choose among competing values.197  But Nis-
senbaum and Barocas do not root the values in these politically legitimate 
decisionmakers.  Who, then, is to be the arbiter?  And how are this entity’s 
decisions to be squared with our democratic and Constitutional commit-
ments?  Finally, as with Professor Balkin’s information fiduciary approach, 
current law provides no broad right to contextual integrity and our gridlocked 
Congress would have to enact such a limit.  This is a major practical hurdle. 
C.  Use-Based Approach 
Two works offer an even more radical departure from traditional notice-
and-choice-based privacy regulation.  Professor Fred Cate, Professor Victor 
Mayer-Schönberger, and Peter Cullen’s white paper, Data Protection Prin-
ciples for the 21st Century,198 and Craig Mundie’s article Privacy Pragma-
tism,199 each begin with the idea that, under traditional privacy regulation, 
people are to receive notice and make a choice at the moment of data collec-
tion.200  As they see it, this is the wrong place in the data lifecycle on which 
                                                          
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Paul Nemitz, Constitutional Democracy and Technology in the Age of Artificial Intelli-
gence, 376 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS A, Aug. 14, 2018, at 1.  
 198.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10.  Cate, Cullen, and Mayer-Schönberger’s paper reports the 
conclusions of a Microsoft-sponsored working group, of which the three authors were members, 
that was organized by the Oxford Internet Institute.  Id. at 11–12 (describing the working group and 
naming its members). 
 199.  Mundie, supra note 42.  
 200.  Id. at 29. 
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to focus, for three reasons.  First, in an era of ubiquitous data collection and 
analytics-driven inferences, people do not have the time or the knowledge to 
make intelligent choices about whether to allow such collection.201  Second, 
limits on collection can prevent companies from assembling the data that they 
need to make socially beneficial predictions, such as those that improve 
health care.202  Finally, when data processing harms people it generally does 
so at the point that the processor uses the data, not when it collects it.203 
These authors accordingly argue that the privacy law system should 
shift its focus from collection and storage, to data use.204  Privacy law should 
allow companies to collect and store personal data without constraint.  But 
the law should limit the ways in which companies can utilize the data that 
they have collected.  “The time has come for a new approach: shifting the 
focus from limiting the collection and retention of data to controlling data at 
the most important point—the moment when it is used.”205  The President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, in a high-profile 2014 re-
port on big data and privacy, relied heavily on Mundie’s article and endorsed 
the use-based approach.206 
While the two papers agree on the superiority of a use-based approach, 
they differ on how to operationalize it.  Professor Cate, Professor Mayer-
Schönberger and Cullen argue that the permissibility of a given use should 
depend on whether its benefits likely outweigh its harms, taking into consid-
eration the measures put into place to reduce those harms.207  Recognizing 
that such benefit-harm balancing must necessarily require difficult, values-
based, “context-specific risk assessment[s],” the authors call on the legisla-
ture to pass laws that would “determine clearly how harms and benefits are 
to be evaluated.”208  The authors further single out data uses that affect a 
                                                          
 201.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 6–7; Mundie, supra note 42, at 30–32. 
 202.  Mundie, supra note 42, at 33 (discussing Kaiser Permanente’s use of big data to find a link 
between expectant mothers’ use of anti-depressant drugs and autism spectrum disorders among their 
children). 
 203.  Id. at 33–34. 
 204.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 8; Mundie, supra note 42, at 29.  Fred Cate articulated the 
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for modernizing the central premises of privacy law is to “[r]educe the focus on data collection and 
the attending notice and consent requirements, and focus more on a practical assessment of the 
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 207.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.  
 208.  Id. at 17–18. 
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person’s “education, employment, physical or mental health, financial posi-
tion, or legally protected rights.”209  They maintain that companies should 
notify individuals of such uses, allow them to access and correct the data 
about themselves, and permit them to challenge “the processing and accu-
racy” of that data.210  This appears to allow individuals to contest the com-
pany’s benefit-cost assessment and, ultimately, to challenge it in court. 
Mundie relies, not on benefit-cost balancing, but on a tech-savvy form 
of individual choice to govern data use.211  He proposes the development of 
software that would “wrap” an individual’s personal information at the point 
of origin with meta-data that expresses the individual’s preferences regarding 
use.212  The wrapper would describe the content of the data within it but 
would not allow the processor to access the data itself until it agreed to abide 
by the terms of use that the data subject had specified.213  Individuals who 
believed that their data had been misused could file a complaint with a regu-
lator who, if it found such misuse, would issue significant penalties.214  Such 
a system, Mundie argues, would allow individuals to “make more informed 
decisions” about whether to allow companies to use their data215 and so pro-
tect themselves against harmful uses. 
The use-based approach to predictive analytics has a number of 
strengths.  It correctly recognizes the limits of notice and choice regulation, 
particularly as applied to predictive analytics.  It shines a useful light on data 
use and on the harms that can occur at this point of the data lifecycle.  And 
Cate, Cullen, and Mayer-Schönberger’s benefit-cost component has some 
appeal in an area that promises both important benefits and significant 
risks.216 
The use-based approach also has significant problems.  To begin with, 
companies can harm individuals not only by using personal data, but also by 
collecting and storing it.  For example, televisions that continuously track and 
report what consumers are watching217 or the always-on, in-home voice as-
                                                          
 209.  Id. at 18. 
 210.  Id. at 18–19. 
 211.  Mundie, supra note 42, at 34. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id.  
 214.  Id. at 36. 
 215.  Id. at 34. 
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sistant that inadvertently recorded and transmitted a couple’s private conver-
sation218 affect people simply by collecting data.  The use-based approach 
would give companies free reign to collect personal information through 
these and other internet-enabled surveillance devices.  Left unchecked, this 
could create an always-on surveillance environment in which our most per-
sonal moments would be recorded and stored.  This would chill our free ex-
pression and push us towards conformity.219  The advocates of the use-based 
approach are too quick to give companies free reign to conduct surveillance 
of this type.  Harm can occur at any point in the data lifecycle—from collec-
tion, to storage, to use—and an approach that recognizes this will be more 
protective than one focused solely on use. 
Mundie’s model of use regulation has a further problem.  The “wrapper” 
around the data is supposed to specify all allowed uses.  But there are far too 
many such uses for a person to understand and determine in advance.  Much 
like the notice and choice paradigm before it, Mundie’s use-based model ends 
up putting an overwhelming burden on the individual.  This shortcoming be-
comes even more profound when applied to predictive analytics.  Companies 
that employ algorithmic decisionmaking often do not know in advance how 
they will use data that they collect.220  They discover this later through the 
search for correlations.  Mundie’s approach assumes that data processors will 
know the uses to which they want to put an individual’s data at the moment 
they collect it, for that is the only way in which a company could, at that 
moment, agree to the data subject’s terms of use.  Mundie’s use-based ap-
proach will not work for predictive analytics. 
Cate, Cullen, and Mayer-Schönberger’s version has more potential.  Its 
benefit-cost approach puts the onus on a regulator, not the individual, to make 
choices about potential uses.  It is also framed broadly enough to apply, not 
just to privacy invasions, but also to bias, exploitation, and manipulation.  
Coupled with the procedural protections that they recommend for especially 
risky data processing, Cate, Cullen, and Mayer-Schönberger’s model begins 
to define a comprehensive approach that could allow people to challenge al-
gorithmic determinations and provide a substantive basis for evaluating these 
claims. 
But Cate, Cullen, and Mayer-Schönberger leave far too much unsaid. 
Where the benefits and costs are not readily reducible to dollars and cents, 
by what metric should they be balanced?  Their proposal says only that 
“harms should be permitted with protections in place appropriate to the risk 
                                                          
 218.  Niraj Chokshi, Is Alexa Listening? Amazon Echo Sent Out Recording of Couple’s Conver-
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and degree of harm,” and that each nation should pass legislation clarifying 
how this will work.221  But the proposal provides little guidance on how to 
fashion the statutory test.  They lead us towards a solution but leave us there 
without essential pieces of the puzzle.222 
D.  Big Data Due Process 
Two important articles published within months of one another—Pro-
fessors Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz’s Big Data and Due Process: To-
ward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms,223 and Professors 
Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale’s The Scored Society: Due Process 
for Automated Predictions224—focus on procedural protections for those who 
are the subjects of, and affected by, analytic processes.  Drawing on Professor 
Citron’s path-breaking article Technological Due Process,225 these articles 
assert that when companies engage in algorithmic adjudications,226 they are 
wielding a quasi-governmental authority that can profoundly affect a per-
son’s life opportunities.227  The “underlying values of due process,”228 espe-
cially transparency and the right to be heard,229 should accordingly apply. 
With regard to transparency, the authors maintain that companies should 
be required to disclose to data subjects and regulators “the issues that were 
predicted, and ideally, the data considered and the methodology em-
ployed.”230  Companies should further create and store an “audit trail that 
records the basis of the predictive decisions, both in terms of the data used 
and the algorithm employed”231 and give individuals and regulators the op-
portunity to access this audit trail on demand.232  If providing this information 
to individuals posed too great a threat to trade secrets or intellectual property 
interests, the company could provide it to an “independent third part[y]” that 
                                                          
 221.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
 222.  Cate, Cullen and Mayer-Schönberger would provide such individuals with notice of the 
determination and an opportunity to challenge its accuracy.  Id. at 18.  But that does not answer the 
question of whether the data use, even if accurate, is not socially acceptable and fair. 
 223.  Crawford & Schultz, supra note 43. 
 224.  Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43. 
 225.  Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008).  
Each of the articles acknowledges this connection.  Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 19; Craw-
ford & Schultz, supra note 43, at 121–24. 
 226.  Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 19; Crawford & Schultz, supra note 43, at 122. 
 227.  Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 19. 
 228.  Id. at 20. 
 229.  Crawford & Schultz, supra note 43, at 124.  
 230.  Id. at 126; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 26, 28.  Companies could provide the 
information in a public statement that resembles a privacy policy.  Crawford & Schultz, supra note 
43, at 126.  Or, they could make it available to affected individuals upon request.  Citron & Pasquale, 
supra note 43, at 28.  
 231.  Crawford & Schultz, supra note 43, at 127–28. 
 232.  Id. at 126; see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 20, 25, 31.  
 
476 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:439 
would review it for bias, errors or other problems.233  This would “protect 
[both the] scorers’ intellectual property and [the] individuals’ interests.”234 
The purpose of these transparency requirements is to allow affected in-
dividuals to understand and, if necessary, challenge the algorithmic deci-
sions.235  Each article argues that individuals should be given an opportunity 
for such a hearing.  This could be a hearing before a representative of the 
company itself.236  Or, an individual could bring a claim before a neutral ar-
biter such as the FTC and allege that the determination was biased or had 
otherwise treated the person unfairly.237  The FTC (or other neutral arbiter) 
would investigate allegations of irregularities that “might render the adjudi-
cation unfair.”238 
In addition to procedural protections, Professors Citron and Pasquale 
argue that companies should be required to obtain a license for their algo-
rithms before using them to make impactful decisions about individuals.239  
The licensor could either be a regulator such as the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission or a private entity that a regulator had itself li-
censed.240  Through the licensing process, public values would be brought to 
bear on these private business activities.  Following the due process meta-
phor, regulatory oversight of corporate algorithmic adjudications to ensure 
substantive fairness241 is akin to supplementing procedural due process with 
substantive due process. 
Professors Citron and Pasquale also make another relevant proposal.  
They suggest that “[t]he FTC can oversee credit-scoring systems under its 
authority to combat ‘unfair’ trade practices under Section 5 of the [FTC] 
Act.”242  Citron and Pasquale’s focus on transparency and other due process 
rights can cause the reader not to take proper notice of this point.  But it is an 
important one.  Here, Citron and Pasquale suggest that, with respect to credit 
scoring systems at least, the FTC could engage in substantive assessments as 
to whether the scoring models are fair.  This insight, which Professor Mark 
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MacCarthy also articulated,243 sets the stage for this Article’s more extended 
analysis of this approach.244 
The technological due process approach to the governance of predictive 
analytics has some real strengths.  By providing regulators and data subjects 
with access to the algorithms and data, this approach will bring sunlight into 
these eligibility determinations and so deter abusive, biased, and erroneous 
decisions.  By giving individuals notice of and the opportunity to challenge 
algorithmic adjudications, it gives people a tool for protecting themselves in 
the algorithmic economy.  It addresses some of the procedural unfairness 
harms associated with predictive analytics.245 
But the technological due process approach requires the individual to 
petition for access to the algorithms and data and to challenge them before a 
company representative or external authority.  Most people will lack the 
knowledge and/or resources to do so.  Procedural due process rights could—
like the notice and consent regime they seek to shore up—sound good in the-
ory but fall short when individuals actually try to take advantage of them. 
Professors Citron and Pasquale’s pre-deployment licensing idea takes 
the burden off individuals and puts it on the company and the licensors.  But 
doing so could create a rigid regulatory bottleneck for companies that must 
move quickly in order to compete.  In an analogous area, the Clean Air Act’s 
pre-construction permitting requirements for facilities that emit criteria air 
pollutants have created major delays for industrial operations that need to 
rebuild their facilities quickly in order to update their products and remain 
competitive.246  The algorithmic economy moves faster than the smokestack 
one, and such delays could take an even greater toll on competitiveness, es-
pecially if other countries did not require such licensing. 
Finally, the licensing requirement and some of the articles’ other pro-
posals would require legislation which will be difficult to achieve in a grid-
locked Congress.247 
                                                          
 243.  MacCarthy, supra note 44, at 488, 490–91 (explaining that the FTC could use its unfairness 
authority to govern privacy issues).  In contrast to Professor MacCarthy, this Article would have 
unfairness authority govern all commercial uses of predictive analytics, not just those that qualify 
as “impermissible uses,” id. at 480, 482, and would not continue to rely heavily on “notice and 
affirmative consent,” id. at 496.  Unlike Professors Citron and Pasquale, this Article does not advo-
cate for pre-implementation licensing of algorithms, Citron & Pasquale, supra, note 43, at 22, and 
focuses more on substantive than on procedural solutions.  That said, this Article owes a debt to 
Professor MacCarthy and to Professors Citron and Pasquale for their initial insight that the FTC 
could productively use its unfairness authority to govern privacy and data analytics.  See MacCarthy, 
supra note 44, at 490–91; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 23. 
 244.  See infra Part V. 
 245.  See supra notes 121–123 and accompanying text.  
 246.  Dennis D. Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmental Law and Policy and The Flexible Pro-
duction Economy, 79 IND. L. J. 611, 635–36 (2004). 
 247.  Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 22. 
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One of Citron and Pasquale’s recommendations avoids these pitfalls: 
their suggestion that the FTC use its unfairness authority to evaluate algorith-
mic credit scoring systems.248  This puts the burden on regulators, who have 
the knowledge and experience to act, rather than on individuals, who often 
do not.249  If the punishments are significant enough, this oversight could 
deter unfair data practices going forward without producing a regulatory bot-
tleneck.  It makes sense to look to unfairness authority for a potential solu-
tion. 
V.  PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS AND THE FTC’S UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY 
The unfairness approach raises as many questions as it answers.  Does 
the FTC have legal authority to apply its unfairness authority to analytics 
eligibility determinations, or would a statutory amendment be required after 
all?  If the FTC does have this authority, how would unfairness authority 
apply to analytic adjudications?  What does it mean for a business practice to 
be “unfair,” and how would the FTC apply this test in this context?  Would 
the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority protect individual and broader social 
interests sufficiently?  Would it give the five FTC Commissioners too much 
unfettered discretion to ban algorithmic practices they personally find objec-
tionable?  In a 2015 essay, the author began a more sustained analysis of 
unfairness authority and predictive analytics.250  This Part expands on this 
initial inquiry and explores, in far greater depth, whether the FTC could use 
its unfairness authority to regulate predictive analytics.251  It begins by de-
scribing the FTC’s unfairness authority and how it could apply to predictive 
analytics.  To make the inquiry more concrete, it identifies a real-world data 
analytics example and explores how unfairness authority would apply to that 
situation.  It then focuses on Congress’s instruction to the FTC that, in mak-
ing unfairness determinations, the FTC “may consider established public pol-
icies,”252 and explains this phrase’s importance.  This Part  concludes by pro-
posing that the FTC use its unfairness authority to regulate predictive 
analytics. 
                                                          
 248.  Id. at 23. 
 249.  Although a regulator such as the FTC would still confront the problem of limited resources 
with which to audit and enforce against algorithms.   
 250.  Hirsch, supra note 45.  
 251.  As explained above, supra notes 44 and 46, the author recognizes and builds on Professor 
Mark MacCarthy’s, and Professors Danielle Keats Citron and Frank Pasquale’s, important insight 
that the FTC could use its unfairness authority to govern data analytics.  
 252.  Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
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A.  Unfairness Authority 
Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the power to declare unlawful 
those business acts or practices that are “unfair or deceptive.”253  As was ex-
plained above this creates two distinct authorities: deceptiveness authority, 
and unfairness authority.254  The FTC’s Section 5 “deceptiveness” authority 
is closely linked to the control paradigm.  It holds businesses to the represen-
tations that they include in their notices and that data subjects rely on when 
they consent.  The FTC’s Section 5 “unfairness” authority is different.  It 
requires the FTC to assess whether particular business practices—such as 
corporate use of data analytics—are fair or not.  It authorizes the regulator to 
draw substantive lines rather than just to enforce the representations that busi-
nesses have made to consumers.255 
Given the U.S. legal system’s preference for individual over social con-
trol, one would expect that the FTC Act would privilege deceptiveness au-
thority over unfairness authority and would permit the FTC to utilize unfair-
ness authority only where individual control was not possible.  That is, in 
fact, what the Act does.  In Section 5, the Act specifies that the FTC may only 
utilize its unfairness authority to address those consumer injuries that are “not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves.”256  In other words, if con-
sumers can protect themselves by making marketplace choices, then the FTC 
should focus on supporting these decisions and limit itself to its deceptive-
ness authority.  If, on the other hand, individuals cannot protect themselves—
if the consumer injuries are “not reasonably avoidable by consumers them-
selves”257—then consumer choice, by definition, is not up to the task.  Here, 
Section 5 empowers the FTC to substitute its own judgment for that of the 
defenseless consumer and to determine whether the business act or practice 
in question is, or is not, fair.  Deceptiveness authority gives way to unfairness 
authority.  As the FTC has explained: 
Normally we expect the marketplace to be self-correcting, and we 
rely on consumer choice—the ability of individual consumers to 
make their own private purchasing decisions without regulatory in-
tervention—to govern the market. . . . However, it has long been 
recognized that certain types of sales techniques may prevent con-
sumers from effectively making their own decisions, and that cor-
rective action may then become necessary. . . . [T]he Commis-
sion’s unfairness matters are brought under these circumstances.  
They are brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of particular 
                                                          
 253.  Id. § 45(a)(1). 
 254.  See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.  
 255.  For an informative and comprehensive description of the FTC’s unfairness authority, see 
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 75, at 638–43. 
 256.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 257.  Id. 
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consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller behavior 
that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the 
free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.258 
The FTC’s deceptiveness authority and unfairness authority thus divide 
the world in two.  Where individuals with accurate information can reasona-
bly protect themselves though their market choices, deceptiveness authority 
governs and seeks to make sure they have accurate (non-deceptive) infor-
mation with which to do so.  Where, even with accurate information, individ-
uals cannot reasonably protect themselves in the marketplace, unfairness au-
thority takes over.259  It draws substantive lines between fair and unfair 
business behavior and so protects individuals where they cannot protect 
themselves. 
This move from supporting market choices to creating substantive pro-
tections is precisely the shift that the rise of predictive analytics makes nec-
essary.  As was explained above, predictive analytics changes the digital 
economy from a marketplace in which individuals could, at least to some 
extent, make meaningful choices about whether to share their personal infor-
mation, to one in which they clearly cannot.260  Today, a company that gets 
a consumer to provide their surface data can infer their latent, often far more 
sensitive, information.  Since individuals cannot understand in advance what 
their data might reveal, they can no longer “reasonably avoid” any injury that 
such disclosure might cause.261  In such a situation, the FTC should move 
from liberalist deceptiveness authority to more interventionist unfairness au-
thority. 
The FTC Act sets out the contours of the FTC’s unfairness authority in 
Title 15 section 45(n) of the United States Code, entitled “Standard of proof; 
public policy considerations.”  Section 45(n) states as follows: 
 The Commission shall have no authority . . . to declare unlawful 
an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair 
unless the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consum-
ers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or to competition.  In determining whether an act or 
practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public 
policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence.  Such 
                                                          
 258.  FTC, COMMISSION STATEMENT OF POLICY ON THE SCOPE OF THE CONSUMER 
UNFAIRNESS JURISDICTION (1980), reprinted in Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984), at 1070, 
1074 [hereinafter FTC, POLICY ON UNFAIRNESS]. 
 259.  Beales, supra note 52, at 5.  
 260.  See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. 
 261.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
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public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for 
such determination.262 
This language creates a three-prong test.  In order to exercise its unfair-
ness authority the FTC must first demonstrate that: (1) the business act or 
practice in question causes “substantial injury to consumers”; (2) consumers 
themselves cannot “reasonably avoid[]” this injury; and (3) the consumer in-
jury that the business practice creates is “not outweighed” by its “benefits to 
consumers or to competition.”263  In addition, section 45(n) makes clear that, 
in determining whether a given act or practice is unfair, the FTC “may con-
sider established public policies” along “with all other evidence.”264 
B.  Predictive Analytics and Unfairness Authority: An Example 
Algorithmic determinations of eligibility for jobs, credit, insurance, 
housing, school admissions, and other important goods and life opportunities 
can harm individuals significantly when tainted by bias or procedural unfair-
ness.  This makes algorithmic adjudications an important context in which to 
assess whether laws and policies can protect people in the algorithmic econ-
omy.  Companies consider predictive algorithms to be trade secrets.265  Once 
in a while, however, the precise algorithm—the set of steps that the company 
employs to make the eligibility determination—does come to light.  Such was 
the case when, in 2008, the FTC filed a complaint against CompuCredit Cor-
poration and Jefferson Capital Systems (“CompuCredit”).266  Compu-
Credit267 was in the business of issuing “subprime” credit cards to individuals 
who could not qualify for standard credit cards.268  It employed a “behavioral 
scoring model” to predict which of its card holders were most likely to default 
on their credit card debt.  It then reduced these individuals’ credit lines by 
half.269 
                                                          
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id.  
 264.  Id. 
 265.  Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 5. 
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CompuCredit probably used a scoring model similar in form to the one 
by which Target determined which of its customers were pregnant.270  It iden-
tified a target variable—high risk of credit card default—that it sought to 
predict among its existing card holders.  It had a set of data that included this 
target variable—the purchasing and credit payment histories of its past cus-
tomers.  It found a pattern of credit card purchases that correlated to default 
on credit card debt.  These correlating items, the proxies,271 included the use 
of the card for cash advances or for payments to: 
• direct marketing merchants 
• marriage counselors 
• personal counselors 
• automobile tire retreading and repair shops 
• bars and night clubs 
• pool and billiard establishments 
• pawnshops 
• and massage parlors.272 
Where CompuCredit saw that a customer had made purchases of this 
type, it inferred the person posed a high risk of default and cut that person’s 
credit in half.273 
Was this algorithmic business practice “unfair”?  If so, was the entire 
behavioral scoring model unfair, or just the use of certain proxies?  By re-
vealing CompuCredit’s scoring model, the FTC’s CompuCredit enforcement 
action provides us with a concise, real-world example with which to explore 
how unfairness authority applies to a business use of predictive analytics-
based eligibility determinations.  The following discussion examines the 
three unfairness prongs—(1) substantial injury, (2) not reasonably avoidable 
by the consumer, and (3) not outweighed by countervailing benefits274—and 
examines how each would apply to the CompuCredit scoring model. 
1.  Substantial Injury 
The first prong of the unfairness test asks whether the business act or 
practice has caused “substantial injury” to consumers.275  Such injuries can 
consist of monetary, economic, health-related, or other types of tangible 
                                                          
 270.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  The FTC Complaint does not describe in detail 
how CompuCredit used predictive analytics. 
 271.  MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 7, at 53–55. 
 272.  CompuCredit Complaint, supra note 268, at 34. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
 275.  Id. 
 
2020] FROM INDIVIDUAL CONTROL TO SOCIAL PROTECTION 483 
harm.276  Some argue that they may also comprise emotional distress and 
other intangible harms,277 although there is considerable dispute over this.278  
The magnitude of the injury must be more than trivial.279  To assess this, the 
FTC may add together a number of discrete injuries to particular individuals 
and assess whether the aggregate injury is substantial.280  The injury cannot 
be speculative.281  There must be a significant, though not a certain, risk of it 
occurring.282  In sum, in order to constitute “substantial injury” the harm must 
be more than trivial, can be aggregated harm from many discrete individuals, 
and must not be speculative.  Economic harms definitely count.  Emotional 
ones may count. 
The CompuCredit behavioral scoring model meets this test.  It reduces 
by half the credit available to those it deems to be at high risk of credit default.  
This is a concrete, economic harm that would satisfy even the most restrictive 
definition of “injury.”  The loss of half of one’s available credit is not “trivial” 
from the perspective of that individual.  If one adds up these discrete individ-
ual injuries it becomes even clearer that they are substantial.  Nor is the injury 
speculative.  CompuCredit is virtually certain to conclude that some of its 
card holders present too high a risk of default, and to reduce their credit ac-
cordingly.  That is the reason that it developed the behavioral scoring model.  
CompuCredit’s analytics-based credit eligibility model clearly creates a 
“substantial injury” and so meets the first prong of the section 45(n) unfair-
ness test. 
2.   Unavoidable by Consumers Themselves 
Under the second element of the section 45(n) unfairness test, consum-
ers must not reasonably be able to avoid the injuries on their own.283  The 
premise here is that, where consumers are able to avoid injuries through their 
                                                          
 276.  FTC, POLICY ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 258,  at 1073; MacCarthy, supra note 44, at 425; 
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market choices, it would be paternalistic for the FTC to do so on their be-
half.284  Regulatory action is appropriate only where there is an “obstacle to 
the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.”285  This element seeks to sep-
arate those instances in which consumers can use market choices to protect 
themselves from those in which they cannot.  The FTC’s use of its unfairness 
authority is appropriate only in the latter category situations.286 
CompuCredit’s card holders could not have imagined that their pur-
chases were revealing their credit default risk any more than the female shop-
pers at Target could have known that their purchases were revealing their 
pregnancy status.  The problem lies in the fact that predictive analytics, by its 
very nature, infers latent information from surface data.  When individuals 
provide the surface data, they cannot know what latent information they are 
also revealing.287  It follows that the card holders could not reasonably have 
avoided the injuries that they experienced.  CompuCredit’s scoring model 
and algorithmic eligibility determinations more generally meet the second 
prong of the unfairness test. 
3.  Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The third element of the section 45(n) unfairness test asks whether the 
activity’s harms are “outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
to competition.”288  The FTC and commentators have interpreted this to re-
quire a cost-benefit analysis.289  The FTC is to weigh the substantial injury 
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that the business practice imposes (the costs), against the benefits that it cre-
ates.290  In order to be deemed unfair, a business practice must be “injurious 
in its net effects.”291  In making this calculation, the FTC considers not only 
the costs and benefits to the individual business and consumers before it, but 
also those to society as a whole.292 
CompuCredit’s behavioral scoring model creates some meaningful ben-
efits.  Assuming the model to be accurate, it will enable the company to re-
duce the number and scale of defaults.  This will make its business more 
profitable.  It will also enable it to offer credit at a lower rate of interest and 
to a wider array of individuals.  This will allow some “sub-prime” borrowers 
to experience the benefits of a credit card who would not otherwise have been 
able to do so. 
The costs of CompuCredit’s actions, too, are significant.  To begin with, 
those whose credit is cut in half suffer a financial injury.  The costs to the 
broader society are even more substantial.  Knowing that use of a credit card 
to purchase particular items caused a reduction in available credit293 could 
deter people from purchasing these items in the future.  The scoring model 
could accordingly lead to fewer people patronizing tire retreading shops, 
marriage counselors, personal counselors, bars and nightclubs, and massage 
parlors.  People who drive too long on worn tires can have accidents that hurt 
themselves and others.  People who need marital or personal counseling but 
forego it because they believe that it will lead to a reduction in their available 
credit can end up divorced, or unhappy, or both.  CompuCredit’s behavioral 
scoring model could, accordingly, impose significant costs on the individuals 
concerned, their children, and the broader society. 
So, do the benefits of CompuCredit’s scoring model outweigh its costs?  
The answer is clearer for some proxies than for others.  The costs of deterring 
people from patronizing bars and nightclubs, pool and billiard halls, pawn-
shops and massage parlors are likely to be small.  The countervailing benefits 
outlined above likely outweigh them.  But the call is much tougher when it 
comes to tire retreading and counseling services because deterring the pur-
chase of these services imposes a real cost on individuals and the broader 
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society.  How is the FTC to assess whether these costs outweigh the benefits?  
And is the answer the same for tire retreading services as for marital and 
personal counseling? 
C.  Established Public Policies 
The FTC Act provides some guidance.  As quoted above294 Congress 
stated that, in evaluating the three unfairness prongs, “the Commission may 
consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all 
other evidence.”295  The history behind this phrase informs its meaning.  It is 
worth taking a brief detour to explore this history before coming back to the 
question of whether CompuCredit’s scoring model is unfair. 
Congress amended the FTC Act in 1938 to give the FTC the authority 
to declare unlawful any “unfair or deceptive act[] or practice[] in or affecting 
commerce.”296  But it was not until the 1964 Cigarette Rule Statement of 
Basis and Purpose (“the Cigarette Rule”)297 that the FTC first articulated the 
criteria that it would use to make such unfairness determinations.  The FTC 
explained that, in determining whether a particular business practice was “un-
fair,” it would examine: 
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previ-
ously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been es-
tablished by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in 
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) 
whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) 
whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors 
or other businessmen).298 
Applying this test, the FTC found that cigarette manufacturers, in failing to 
disclose the health effects of their product, had behaved unfairly.299 
The FTC’s reference to “public policy” in the first part of the Cigarette 
Rule test suggests that the FTC will look to the underlying values—the “pe-
numbras”—of existing statutes, regulations, and common law decisions in 
order to inform how it interprets and applies its own unfairness authority.  
The FTC is not saying that it will enforce these other laws300 since other 
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agencies and courts presumably do that.  Rather, it is saying that  it will con-
sider the “public policies” at the heart of these other laws when interpreting 
and applying its own unfairness authority.301  While the FTC’s interpretation 
of unfairness would change in later years, this idea of looking to the public 
policies and “penumbras” that underlie existing laws as a reference point for 
determining what was unfair, has remained an important theme. 
In the years that followed its issuance of the Cigarette Rule, the FTC 
made sparing use of its unfairness authority.302  That changed in 1972 with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.303 in which 
the Court cited with approval the Cigarette Rule’s three-part test.304  The FTC 
took this as an invitation to hold business acts and practices to be unfair if 
they violated any one of the three articulated factors.305  In the 1970s the FTC, 
thus empowered, embarked on its most extensive use of unfairness authority 
to date.306 
This spawned a backlash.307  The business community,308 scholarly 
commentators,309 and ultimately members of Congress310 expressed concern 
over the fact that the FTC could deem a business practice to be unfair if it 
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the broader interpretation, stating that the FTC, in applying its unfairness authority, acts “like a court 
of equity, [and] considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed 
in the spirit of the antitrust laws.”  405 U.S. at 244.  
 304.  Id. at 244 & n.5.  
 305.  Belt, supra note 290, at 2 (citing an example). 
 306.  Id. (discussing Over-the-Counter Drug Rulemaking regarding the ban of advertising di-
rected to children on grounds that such advertising was “immoral, unscrupulous and unethical”). 
 307.  HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38 at 60–66 (describing the FTC’s KidVid rulemaking, the con-
troversy it provoked, and how both Congress and the FTC reacted to this controversy); Belt, supra 
note 290, at 2; G. S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement: Broadening 
Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 163, 168 (2012) 
(discussing the “very public and contentious debate” over FTC’s unfairness authority that played 
out from the late 1960s through the 1980s).  
 308.  Hans, supra note 307, at 168 (stating that, in the 1970s, “[t]he FTC’s unprecedented vig-
orous enforcement led to a backlash from businesses that did not respond well to increased govern-
ment oversight and regulation”). 
 309.  Belt, supra note 290, at 2 (citing David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC: Misad-
ventures in Law and Economics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (1984); Teresa M. Schwartz, Regu-
lating Unfair Practices Under the FTC Act: The Need for a Legal Standard of Unfairness, 11 
AKRON L. REV. 1, 21 (1977)). 
 310.  Beales, supra note 52, at 3. 
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either offended public policy (the “penumbras” of existing laws), or was im-
moral/unethical, or caused substantial injury to consumers.  These critics 
were particularly disturbed by the fact that, in making such unfairness deci-
sions, the FTC did not need to consider the practices’ benefits and weigh 
them against the harms.311  They argued that such a standard gave the FTC 
virtually unfettered discretion to declare any business practice unfair, and so 
unlawful,312 if a majority of five Commissioners agreed that it was “immoral” 
or offended their view of public policy.  Members of Congress were so upset 
that at one point Congress withheld the FTC’s funding and forced it to shut 
down for a few days.313 
The FTC responded with a policy statement through which it sought to 
constrain its own unfairness authority to mollify its critics.314  In its 1980 
Policy Statement on Unfairness,315 the FTC articulated, for the first time, the 
now-familiar three-part test for when a given business practice is unfair.  It 
stated, “To justify a finding of unfairness the injury must satisfy three tests.  
It must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any countervailing 
benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and it must 
be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have 
avoided.”316 
The 1980 Policy Statement also changed the role that public policy 
would play in unfairness determinations.  The FTC no longer identified it as 
a separate basis for declaring a business act or practice to be unfair.  Instead, 
the FTC explained that it would, for the most part, use public policy only to 
inform its application of the new, three-prong test.317  That is, it would look 
to existing, established public policies, ascertain their underlying values 
(their “penumbras”), and then interpret “substantial injury,” “countervailing 
benefits,” and the other aspects of the three-part test in light of these values.  
The FTC further committed to relying only on “well-established” public pol-
icies.318  Employed in this way, public policy would inform the FTC’s inter-
pretation of the three-prong unfairness test, make sure that it was in line with 
                                                          
 311.  Id. at 1–3. 
 312.  Id.  
 313.  Id.; HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 65–66 (explaining that the KidVid controversy of the 
late 1970s “threatened [the FTC’s] very existence”). 
 314.  HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 121; Hans, supra note 307, at 168. 
 315.  FTC, POLICY ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 258, at 1073. 
 316.  Id.  
 317.  Id.; Hans, supra note 307, at 169; Beales, supra note 52, at 3.  The FTC in the 1980 Policy 
Statement did, however, leave open possibility that it could use public policy as an independent 
basis for unfairness determinations when “the policy is so clear that it will entirely determine the 
question of consumer injury.”  FTC, POLICY ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 258, at 1075; Beales, 
supra note 52, at 3.  Congress foreclosed this possibility in the 1994 Amendments when it codified 
the three-prong test.  Thereafter, the FTC was only to use public policy to inform its interpretation 
of the three unfairness criteria; it was not to employ it as an independent basis for action. 
 318.  FTC, POLICY ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 258, at 1076. 
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the values that Congress and the courts had expressed, and so provide an 
“important check on the overall reasonableness of the Commission’s ac-
tions.”319 
In 1994, Congress enacted Title 15, section 45(n) of the United States 
Code, quoted above,320 which codified the now-familiar three-prong unfair-
ness test.321  The new section 45(n) also confirmed public policy’s new role.  
Henceforth, public policy could serve only as a basis for interpreting the 
three, specified prongs.322  It could not provide independent grounds for find-
ing a particular business practice to be unfair.323 
This history makes it possible to understand more fully Congress’s sec-
tion 45(n) instruction, referred to above,324 that “[i]n determining whether an 
act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public 
policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence.  Such public 
policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determina-
tion.”325  This language does not permit the FTC to use public policy as in-
dependent grounds for finding particular business practices to be unfair.  But 
it does allow the FTC to consider established public policies and their under-
lying values as a reference point for interpreting the three prongs of the un-
fairness test.  It thus turns public policy from an independent basis for unfair-
ness determinations into an interpretative tool that tethers the FTC’s 
unfairness judgments to the values that Congress and the courts have articu-
lated elsewhere.326  In his highly informative book on the FTC and its in-
volvement in privacy regulation, Professor Chris Hoofnagle explains that 
“established public polic[ies],” used in this context, mean policies that are 
“widely followed, and embodied in statutes, judicial decisions, or the Consti-
tution.”327 
This takes us back to the interpretative question that CompuCredit’s be-
havioral scoring model presents.  Is it “unfair” to cut someone’s credit in half 
because they patronize bars and nightclubs?  Tire retreading and auto repair 
shops?  Marital and personal counselors?  Can “established public policies” 
                                                          
 319.  Id. at 1075 n.27. 
 320.  See supra notes 262–264 and accompanying text. 
 321.  Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, sec. 9, § 5, 
108 Stat. 1691, 1695 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012)); HOOFNAGLE, supra note 
38, at 131. 
 322.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (“In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission 
may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence.”).  
 323.  Id. (“Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determi-
nation.”).  
 324.  See supra note 295 and accompanying text.  
 325.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  
 326.  Solove & Hartzog, supra note 75, at 639 (explaining that the FTC uses established public 
policies to help it determine when consumer injury is substantial). 
 327.  HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 133. 
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tell us anything about how to assess the costs and benefits of these algorith-
mic eligibility determinations? 
They can.  As was explained above, one of the costs of CompuCredit’s 
approach is that it might deter people from engaging in the proxy activities.328  
While there may be reasons why it might be harmful to deter people from 
frequenting bars and nightclubs (fewer opportunities to socialize) or from 
purchasing tire retreading services (greater risk of a car accident), no estab-
lished public policy specifically identifies the value of these services or the 
social cost of having people forego them. 
The situation is quite different with respect to marital and personal coun-
seling services.  All fifty states and the District of Columbia have established 
a psychotherapist-patient privilege in order to encourage people who need 
counseling services to visit and speak openly to a counselor.329  The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond330 took note of this universal common 
law principle in deciding, under Rule 501 of the Rules of Evidence, to adopt 
the psychotherapist-patient privilege as a matter of federal law and to extend 
it to social workers in addition to psychologists and psychiatrists.331  The 
Court explained that the psychotherapist-patient privilege serves the public 
interest by facilitating the appropriate treatment of those experiencing mental 
illnesses.332  “The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical 
health, is a public good of transcendent importance.”333 
CompuCredit’s denial of credit to those who purchase marital or coun-
seling services, if widely adopted in the credit industry, could deter people 
from obtaining such counseling services, even when they badly need them.  
This would not only injure the individuals in question but, as the Supreme 
Court and all fifty states have recognized, it would hurt the public as a whole 
by damaging mental health which is a “public good of transcendent im-
portance.”334  Given the many public policies that encourage marriage and 
treat it as valuable, one can assume that marital counseling, no less than per-
sonal counseling, provides great value to society, and that an algorithmic for-
mula that penalized people for seeking marital counseling would have a sim-
ilarly large, negative social impact. 
                                                          
 328.  See supra note 299 and accompanying text. 
 329.  See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996), (noting that “the existence of a consensus 
among the States indicates that ‘reason and experience’ support recognition of the privilege”). 
 330.  518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  Id. at 11. 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  Id. 
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“Established public policies,” as the FTC Act uses the term, includes 
not only federal constitutional and statutory law but also federal judicial prec-
edents, state statutes, and state common law.335  The Supreme Court’s Jaffee 
decision and the common law’s universal embrace of the psychotherapist-
patient privilege suggest that the public gets great value when people seek 
out counseling services and would suffer a great cost were they to be deterred 
from doing so. 
The underlying value of these federal and state common law deci-
sions—the “penumbra” of these laws, as the FTC called it in the 1964 Ciga-
rette Rule336—informs the interpretative question that CompuCredit’s behav-
ioral scoring model presents.  It suggests that CompuCredit’s decision to cut 
the credit of those who purchase marital and personal counseling service, 
while it may produce some benefits, could cause major harm to individuals 
and the broader society.  It is thus “injurious in its net effects,” and so un-
fair.337  By contrast, CompuCredit’s decision to reduce the credit of those 
who purchase bar and nightclub, massage parlor, or even tire retreading ser-
vices are less costly to society and so may be outweighed by their corporate 
and social benefits.  This would make CompuCredit’s use of the latter proxies 
“fair” but its decision to cut the credit of those who purchase marital or per-
sonal counseling “unfair” and so unlawful. 
D.  A Proposal 
The CompuCredit behavioral scoring model thus provides an example 
of how the FTC could apply unfairness authority, structured by the three-
prong analysis and grounded in the penumbras of established public policies, 
to algorithmic eligibility determinations.  It also shows that the FTC’s au-
thority is not as unbounded as it was in the 1970s when its use of this power 
proved so controversial.  Since the 1994 amendments to the FTC Act, the 
FTC must show that the activity in question meets the three-pronged, statu-
tory unfairness test.338  While the test itself—particularly the third prong’s 
weighing of costs and benefits—affords the FTC a lot of discretion, Congress 
has provided it with an interpretative guide for navigating its way through the 
grey areas.  The Commissioners are not to rely on their own views of what 
would, or would not, be best for society.  They are to look to “established 
public policies,” identify the values that inform and underlie these policies 
and apply those values to the situation before them.339 
                                                          
 335.  FTC, POLICY ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 258, at 1074–76 (referring to “statute[s], com-
mon law” and “judicial decisions” as sources of established public policy).  
 336.  29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964). 
 337.  FTC, POLICY ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 258, at 1073.   
 338.  See supra notes 262–264 and accompanying text (describing this test). 
 339.  Lawyers routinely engage in this type of reasoning when interpreting statutes or regula-
tions.  EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949). 
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Of course, there will be close calls, instances when there are important 
public policies on both sides of the argument.  Congress’s attempts to con-
strain the FTC’s unfairness discretion suggests that, in such instances, the 
FTC should allow the business activity to proceed until such time as it be-
comes clearer that the injuries outweigh the benefits.340  But, even with this 
caveat, unfairness authority could still provide important protections.  It 
could prevent the use of predictive analytics where the costs to individuals 
and society clearly outweigh the activity’s benefits.  On these grounds, the 
FTC could deem to be unlawful those commercial uses of predictive analytics 
that invade privacy, result in bias against protected classes, are unduly ma-
nipulative, or are procedurally unfair.  In finding these practices to be unfair, 
the FTC  could refer to the penumbras of existing anti-discrimination, unfair 
business practice, or privacy laws—established public policies all. 
Over time, the FTC’s unfairness determinations could establish a frame-
work for distinguishing responsible from irresponsible business uses of pre-
dictive analytics.341  The FTC could create some much-needed rules of the 
                                                          
 340.  Beales, supra note 52, at 5 (stating that the FTC should not be in the business of second-
guessing market outcomes where costs and benefits are closely balanced).  
 341.  Cf. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 75, at 649–50 (explaining how, in other areas, the FTC 
begins by articulating general standards but gradually begins to develop more specific rules).  The 
FTC’s use of unfairness authority to regulate corporate data security practices, discussed above, see 
supra Part V, has generated an interesting debate over the merits of such an approach to adminis-
trative policymaking.  On the one hand, Solove and Hartzog commend the FTC for a “common law” 
approach that begins with general data security standards and, through a series of enforcement ac-
tions, articulates over time more specific guidelines.  Solove & Hartzog, supra note 75, at 657.  On 
the other hand, Professor Gus Hurwitz maintains that such policymaking through enforcement is a 
sub-optimal way of producing agency policy and denies regulated parties fair notice and due pro-
cess.  Gus Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 997–
1008 (2016). 
  As the author has argued previously, the law is clear: The FTC and other agencies have 
broad discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudicative policymaking as a means of devel-
oping policy.  Hirsch, supra note 45, at 360–61; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 
(1947) [hereinafter “Chenery II”].  Professor Hurwitz admits as much (“Chenery II is still good law 
today.”), though he argues that the Supreme Court may soon defer less and require greater reliance 
on rulemaking.  Hurwitz, supra at 962.  
  If indeed the Court is to narrow agencies’ discretion in this important area, it should not do 
so with respect to the FTC’s regulation of predictive analytics.  In Chenery II, the Court articulated 
the reasons why agencies may need to proceed by adjudicative policymaking instead of rulemaking: 
[T]he agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant 
rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule.  Or the problem may be so 
specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of 
a general rule.  In those situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems 
on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective . . . . And the choice 
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that 
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.   
Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202–03.   
  The Court’s reasoning applies with striking clarity to the regulation of predictive analytics.  
The field of predictive analytics is evolving rapidly in many economic sectors at once.  The FTC is 
not even close to understanding it well enough to promulgate workable, general rules.  In such an 
area, an agency must use adjudicative policymaking’s incremental, common law approach “if the 
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road for this growing and increasingly important part of the economy.  Such 
rules would not only protect individuals in the algorithmic era.  It would also 
make the commercial application of predictive analytics more socially ac-
ceptable and so more sustainable in the long term, and so allow society more 
fully to enjoy its many benefits.342  For all of these reasons, this Article pro-
poses that the FTC use its unfairness authority to establish substantive pa-
rameters as to which uses of predictive analytics are socially appropriate and 
fair, and which are not. 
E.  Comparing the Various Approaches 
The unfairness approach protects individuals from the threats of predic-
tive analytics more fully and more effectively than the other proposed regu-
latory frameworks described in Part IV.  To begin with, it does not depend 
on Congress to pass a new statute the way that the information fiduciary or 
contextual integrity approaches do.  Congress has already enacted the statute: 
Section 5 of the FTC Act.  The FTC has the authority, right now, to start 
declaring abusive algorithmic determinations to be “unfair.”343  This is a ma-
jor advantage at a time of a gridlocked Congress and unpredictable President. 
Next, unfairness authority tasks a regulator—the FTC—with evaluating 
the fairness of algorithmic adjudications.  It does not burden individuals with 
the need to articulate all of their preferences the way that Mundie’s use-based 
approach does.344  Mundie’s proposal suffers from the same shortcoming as 
the notice-and-consent-based control regime that it seeks to replace: It sad-
dles individuals with an unrealistic burden that will prevent most of them 
from taking advantage of the protection that the proposal offers.  The unfair-
ness approach does not rely on individual action.  It gives this task to a regu-
lator, one that has a long record of enforcement and has developed substantial 
expertise with respect to the information economy and privacy.345 
                                                          
administrative process is to be effective.”  Id. at 203.  Over time, the FTC may acquire enough 
knowledge and expertise to produce rules that make sense and achieve their intended aims.  As 
Professor Margot Kaminski has recently argued, it may even employ a sector-based, co-regulatory 
approach to this end.  Margot Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach 
to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529 (2019).  But in this area, the FTC is wise to 
start with investigative reports, workshops, guidance, and adjudicative policymaking, not generally 
applicable and inflexible rules.  Hirsch, supra note 45, at 360–61. 
 342.  WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION INITIATIVE IN COLLABORATION 
WITH ACCENTURE (2018), http://reports.weforum.org/digital-transformation/wp-con-
tent/blogs.dir/94/mp/files/pages/files/dti-executive-summary-20180510.pdf.  
 343.  For a discussion of whether the FTC’s Section 5 unfairness authority reaches this far, see 
infra Section VI.A; see also Hartzog, supra note 39, at 814 (“[T]he FTC does not need a new au-
thorization of power to tackle a new technology.  It is sufficient if a company uses a new technology 
in commerce to harm or mislead consumers.”). 
 344.  See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
 345.  The FTC will face some significant challenges in playing this role.  These include its cum-
bersome Magnuson-Moss rulemaking authority, limited resources, lack of civil penalty authority, 
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The unfairness approach applies far more broadly than Professor Bal-
kin’s information fiduciary standard.346  As was explained above, Balkin’s 
proposal would apply only to those companies that have direct relationships 
with individuals and so can be said to stand in a fiduciary relationship with 
them.347  The Section 5 unfairness approach suffers from no such limitation 
and the FTC could apply it to all parts of the algorithmic economy.  Balkin 
himself recognizes that his proposed approach does not reach those compa-
nies that make algorithmic eligibility determinations about individuals but 
have no relationship with them.  For these companies, he acknowledges that: 
[W]e can no longer rely on the notion of special fiduciary relation-
ships between individuals and companies to regulate the use and 
abuse of data.  Instead, we must ask what duties of good faith and 
ethical conduct in the collection, analysis, use, sale and distribution 
of data are owed to the members of society as a whole.348 
That question—what duties of good faith and ethical conduct do all compa-
nies that employ predictive analytics owe to society—is precisely the one that 
unfairness authority wrestles with and seeks to answer. 
The unfairness approach also avoids the other main problem with the 
information fiduciary model.  As was explained above, a market system does 
not require a business (e.g., a company considering an employee for a pro-
motion) to put individuals’ interests ahead of its own.349  That is why the law 
has traditionally imposed fiduciary obligations only on a small subset of pro-
fessions (e.g., lawyers, doctors) whose very role requires that they put their 
clients’ interests first.  It allows other companies to make appropriate busi-
ness decisions so long as they do so in a way that is fair and does not unduly 
                                                          
and controversial history.  See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 334–35 (describing these weak-
nesses).  Congress could amend the FTC Act to remedy some of these shortcomings.  Even without 
such legislation, it is worth remembering the strengths the FTC would bring to the task.  As Profes-
sor Chris Hoofnagle articulated so well, “the FTC is a nimble agency” that is necessarily bi-partisan, 
operates with a common law approach that builds policies incrementally, combines economic con-
siderations with other social priorities, and has shown itself to be a good strategist.  Id. at 364–65.  
Similarly, Professor Woody Hartzog has explained that the FTC is well-suited to govern robots and 
other emerging technologies.  Hartzog, supra note 39, at 824–31.  The FTC: 
[H]as developed a robust body of law to draw from . . . has a track-record of fostering 
nascent technologies like the Internet . . . gives deference to industry standards where 
relevant, which will keep the law . . . from being arbitrary and disconnected from prac-
tice . . . [and] regularly cooperates with other regulatory bodies and can use this experi-
ence to build consensus . . . . 
Hartzog, supra note 39, at 825.  In looking for an agency to set the rules of the road for the algorith-
mic economy, one could do far worse.  
 346.  See supra notes 176–181 and accompanying text. 
 347.  Balkin, supra note 40, at 1233–34.  
 348.  Id. 
 349.  See supra notes 178–181 and accompanying text. 
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take advantage of others.  That is what the FTC’s unfairness authority re-
quires.  It makes far more sense to hold companies in the algorithmic econ-
omy to an unfairness standard than to duties of care or loyalty. 
The unfairness approach would not produce a regulatory bottleneck of 
the type that Professors Citron and Pasquale’s pre-deployment licensing re-
quirement would create.350  Under its unfairness authority, the FTC would 
evaluate algorithmic determinations after a company makes them and would 
at that point determine whether or not they were unfair.  It would not make 
companies wait for this determination before proceeding, as they would un-
der the Citron and Pasquale proposal.  The important role that speed and in-
novation play in the algorithmic economy makes ex poste unfairness author-
ity much more practical than an ex ante licensing requirement.  There is value 
in providing companies with ex ante guidance as to their obligations.  But the 
FTC could achieve this without pre-deployment licensing.  For example, the 
FTC could issue a report or other form of regulatory guidance to alert com-
panies as to how it will apply the unfairness test to algorithmic decisionmak-
ing.  The growing bank of FTC unfairness determinations would further pro-
vide companies with a sense of their obligations without creating a regulatory 
bottleneck in this fast-moving and rapidly changing part of the economy. 
The unfairness standard is much clearer and well-defined than Professor 
Cate, Professor Mayer-Schönberger’s, and Peter Cullen’s “cost-benefit” as-
sessment,351 or Professors Nissenbaum and Barocas’s vague test for when 
norm-breaking algorithmic operations should be allowed.352  Cate, Mayer-
Schönberger, and Cullen do not explain how their cost-benefit analysis would 
work, calling instead on the legislature to pass laws that would “determine 
clearly how harms and benefits are to be evaluated.”353  The FTC Act, by 
contrast, establishes the three-prong test and identifies a body of principles—
“established public policies”—for interpreting these prongs.354  The FTC’s 
decades of unfairness decisions further flesh out and define the unfairness 
standard. 
Professors Nissenbaum and Barocas’s invocation of broad principles 
like justice or autonomy would, in some respects, take us back to the days of 
the 1964 Cigarette Rule when the FTC found business acts to be unfair if, in 
the Commissioners’ view, they were “immoral, unethical, oppressive, or un-
scrupulous.”355  It was precisely such unbounded moral determinations that 
led to the backlash against the FTC in the 1970s.356  Since that time, the FTC 
                                                          
 350.  See supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
 351.  See supra notes 207–208 and accompanying text. 
 352.  See supra notes 195–196 and accompanying text.  
 353.  CATE ET AL., supra note 10, at 17. 
 354.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
 355.  29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964). 
 356.  See supra notes 307–313 and accompanying text. 
 
496 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:439 
and Congress have worked to define better the parameters of the FTC’s un-
fairness authority through the 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness and the 
1994 FTC Act Amendments that created the three-prong test.  Nissenbaum 
and Barocas’s approach would cast off these constraints and, most likely, 
generate the type of controversy that the FTC faced in the past. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the FTC’s unfairness authority 
possesses a political legitimacy that most of the other proposals lack.  The 
new regulatory paradigm will need to draw substantive lines between predic-
tive analytics practices that are socially acceptable, and those that are not.  
This will require engaging with, and choosing between, competing values.  
In a democracy, the elected representatives, or those to whom they have law-
fully delegated their power, draw these lines most legitimately.357  Nissen-
baum and Barocas’s approach, which grounds its value judgments more in 
philosophical concepts than in legislative determinations, lacks political le-
gitimacy in a democracy. 
The FTC roots its unfairness determinations in the legislatively-deter-
mined three-prong test and in “established public policies.”  This positivist 
approach, which looks for values in existing legal texts, makes FTC unfair-
ness determinations more politically legitimate than Nissenbaum and Baro-
cas’s philosophical judgments. 
Professors Citron and Pasquale and Professors Crawford and Schultz 
focus, not on substantive value judgments, but on procedural mechanisms 
that will allow individuals and regulators to interrogate and challenge corpo-
rate algorithmic decisionmaking.  This very useful addition should be built 
into any new paradigm for the regulation of predictive analytics.  It assumes, 
rather than replaces, a standard for determining which algorithmic processes 
are socially acceptable, and which are not.  It requires a means of drawing 
these substantive lines.  As Citron and Pasquale themselves recognize, un-
fairness authority can provide this mechanism.358 
VI.  LEGAL AND POLICY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE UNFAIRNESS APPROACH 
Part V identifies seven distinct advantages that unfairness authority has 
over the other main proposals.359  Specifically, unfairness authority: (1) does 
not depend on Congress to pass a new statute the way that the information 
fiduciary or contextual integrity approaches do;360 (2) tasks the FTC with 
making the fairness evaluations and does not require individuals to articulate 
all of their preferences the way that Mundie’s use-based approach does;361 
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 360.  See supra note 343 and accompanying text. 
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(3) applies far more broadly than Professor Balkin’s information fiduciary 
standard;362 (4) does not require businesses to put individuals’ interests ahead 
of their own the way that the information fiduciary standard would;363 (5) 
provides guidance to companies without creating a regulatory bottleneck of 
the type that Citron and Pasquale’s pre-deployment licensing would pro-
duce;364 (6) provides a clearer standard for distinguishing between acceptable 
and unacceptable analytic practices than Nissenbaum and Barocas’s or Cate, 
Mayer-Schönberger, and Cullen’s approaches would establish;365 and (7) 
proposes a more politically legitimate standard than Nissenbaum and Baro-
cas’s morality-based judgments.366  But an important question remains: does 
the FTC have the legal jurisdiction and political latitude to apply its unfair-
ness authority to predictive analytics?  This Part assesses whether the FTC’s 
Section 5 unfairness authority is broad enough to encompass the regulation 
of predictive analytics, whether the FTC’s use of its unfairness authority to 
regulate predictive analytics would offend the First Amendment, and whether 
such an application of unfairness authority would prove too controversial.  It 
concludes that none of these issues should prevent the FTC from deploying 
its unfairness authority against unfair analytic practices. 
A.  Does the FTC’s Section 5 Unfairness Authority Extend to Predictive 
Analytics? 
Section 5 of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to declare certain business 
acts and practices to be “unfair” and to order companies to stop engaging in 
them.367  Does this authority allow the FTC to pursue companies whose pre-
dictive analytics operations cause privacy invasions, manipulation, bias, 
and/or procedural unfairness?  This is a question of statutory interpretation 
and should be settled by looking first to the statute’s plain language, then to 
legislative history, and then to judicial interpretations of the statutory provi-
sion at issue.368  All three suggest that the FTC’s unfairness authority is suf-
ficiently broad and flexible to govern the risks that predictive analytics and 
other emerging technologies can create. 
1.  Plain Language 
Beginning with the plain statutory language, FTC Act at Title 15, sec-
tion 45(a)(1) of the United States Code states that “unfair or deceptive acts 
                                                          
 362.  See supra notes 346–348 and accompanying text. 
 363.  See supra note 349 and accompanying text. 
 364.  See supra note 350 and accompanying text. 
 365.  See supra notes 351–354 and accompanying text. 
 366.  See supra note 357 and accompanying text.  
 367.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 368.  73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 83 (2012) (stating that legislative history aids in interpretation 
when a statute is not clear and unambiguous).  
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or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”369  Sec-
tion 45(n) does not affirmatively define the term “unfair” but rather specifies 
that the FTC may not deem a business act or practice to be unfair unless it 
meets the three-prong test described above.370  The Merriam-Webster Dic-
tionary defines “unfair” as “1: marked by injustice, partiality, or deception : 
unjust; 2: not equitable in business dealings.”371  Algorithmic decisions in-
fected by bias are “marked by injustice”; the use of predictive analytics to 
manipulate people into transactions that harm them are “not equitable in busi-
ness dealings;” and analytic processes that adjudicate people’s life opportu-
nities without transparency, recourse, or other basic due process rights are 
“unjust.”372  In short, algorithmic eligibility determinations can be “unfair” 
as the dictionary defines that term.  As illustrated above in the CompuCredit 
example, they can also qualify as unfair under the FTC Act’s three-prong 
test.373  The statutory plain language appears to support the FTC’s use of un-
fairness authority to address predictive analytics’ potential harms.374 
2.  Legislative History 
The term “unfair” first appears in the original, 1914 version of the FTC 
Act where Congress stated that “unfair methods of competition in commerce 
are hereby declared unlawful.”375  By the 1930s, questions began to arise 
about whether this authority served only an antitrust purpose and applied ex-
clusively to businesses’ unfair actions against competitors or whether it also 
served a consumer protection purpose and governed companies’ unfair be-
havior towards consumers.376  The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 settled the ques-
tion in favor of the latter view.  It amended the FTC Act to read that “[u]nfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”377  
This made clear that the FTC could enforce both against unfairly competitive 
practices and against unfair treatment of consumers.  The word “unfair” thus 
appears twice in Section 5(a), once in reference to competition and the second 
                                                          
 369.  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
 370.  See supra notes 262–264 and accompanying text. 
 371.  Unfair, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unfair (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2019).   
 372.  See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 43, at 18–20. 
 373.  See supra Section V.B. 
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time with regard to consumer protection.  Courts have held that the word 
“unfair” has the same meaning in both places.378 
Congress intended the FTC’s unfairness jurisdiction to be a “broad dis-
cretionary authority” that would enable the FTC “to define unfair practices 
on a flexible, incremental basis.”379  The reasons for this were straightfor-
ward.  Congress recognized that unfairness could take many forms that the 
legislators themselves could not anticipate.  As the Senate Report on the 1914 
Act explained: 
 The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to 
whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair 
practices which prevail in commerce . . . . It concluded that . . . 
there were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 
of them into the law it would be quite possible to invent others.380 
Given this, legislators recognized that the only way that the unfairness 
doctrine could retain its vitality over time would be for the FTC to have the 
flexibility to fit it to new business practices and harms as they arose.381  “Con-
gress affirmatively made a policy decision to choose vague language . . . be-
cause business practices and technology were constantly evolving, causing 
new problems that Congress could not quickly act to remedy.”382  Congress 
believed that this flexibility would “endow the commission with tremendous 
discretion to move against abuses not yet invented.”383 
3.  Case law 
Courts that have reviewed Section 5 and its legislative history have con-
sistently reinforced the idea that Section 5 unfairness is broad, flexible, and 
                                                          
 378.  FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 615 (D.N.J. 2014) (quoting Am. 
Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 30. 
 379.  Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 615 (quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 767 
F.2d at 967).  See generally HOOFNAGLE, supra note 38, at 10–13 (describing Congress’s decision 
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fair competition must necessarily soon prove incomplete, as with new conditions constantly arising 
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 383.  KANWIT, supra note 380, at 72; see also LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (“Congress ‘intentionally left development of the term “unfair” to the Commission’ 
through case-by-case litigation . . . .”); Hartzog, supra note 39, at 812–13. 
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capable of addressing new business practices and harms.  They have stated 
that Congress designed the term as a “flexible concept with evolving con-
tent;”384 that it “intentionally left [its] development [of the term ‘unfair’] . . . 
to the Commission;”385 and that “Congress ‘explicitly considered, and re-
jected, the notion that it reduce the ambiguity of the phrase “unfair methods 
of competition” . . . by enumerating the particular practices to which it was 
intended to apply.’”386  In a 1934 case, the Supreme Court found it “unnec-
essary to attempt a comprehensive definition of the unfair methods which are 
banned, even if it were possible to do so. . . . New or different practices must 
be considered as they arise in the light of the circumstances in which they are 
employed.” 387  These decisions established a pattern in which “courts have 
deferred to the Commission’s determination of what is unlawful in both the 
competition and consumer protection areas.”388 
Recent FTC unfairness actions against companies that suffer data secu-
rity breaches, and judicial decisions upholding this exercise of authority, re-
affirm this long-standing judicial interpretation of the Act.  A decade or so 
ago, the FTC began to focus on the growing number of data security breaches 
and their impact on consumers.  It used its Section 5 unfairness authority to 
address this digital age threat.  The FTC brought a series of complaints 
against companies that had suffered data security breaches on the grounds 
that, where consumers had entrusted a company with their personal infor-
mation, a company’s failure to take reasonable measures to protect this data 
was “unfair.” 
Most of the companies that received such a complaint settled with the 
FTC.389  Two, however, did not.  In separate matters, Wyndham Worldwide 
Corp.390 and LabMD391 challenged the FTC’s action in court.  Each argued 
that the FTC had exceeded the bounds of its unfairness authority when it ap-
plied it to the corporate cybersecurity practices—an area of business action 
that did not even exist at the time of the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Act.  Each of 
these cases thus squarely presented the question of whether the FTC’s unfair-
                                                          
 384.  FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941). 
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ness authority was capacious enough to encompass digital age business prac-
tices and the threats that they caused.  Each produced federal district court 
and circuit court decisions that addressed this question. 
The Third Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.392 and the Elev-
enth Circuit in LabMD, Inc. v. FTC393 each held, consistent with the cases 
cited above,394 that Congress intended the FTC’s unfairness authority to be 
broad and flexible so that the FTC could address new threats as they arose.  
After reviewing the history of the FTC’s Section 5 unfairness authority the 
Third Circuit concluded that “[t]he takeaway is that Congress designed the 
term as a ‘flexible concept with evolving content.’”395  It held that the FTC 
clearly had the power to declare unreasonably lax security measures that re-
sulted in data security breaches to be unfair, so long as they satisfied section 
45(n)’s three-prong test.396  The Eleventh Circuit, in LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 
interpreted the statute in much the same way stating that, “[r]ather than list 
‘the particular practices to which [unfairness] was intended to apply,’ Con-
gress ‘intentionally left development of the term “unfair” to the Commission’ 
through case-by-case litigation.”397  It, too, concluded that the FTC’s unfair-
ness authority was capacious enough to encompass unreasonably weak cy-
bersecurity practices. 
If the FTC’s unfairness authority is broad enough to encompass unrea-
sonably lax data security methods and the injuries they cause, it should sim-
ilarly cover harmful predictive analytics practices and the threats they 
pose.398  Data security breaches and analytic unfairness each represents a new 
type of digital age threat that Congress could not have anticipated in 1938 
when it passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendments but that it would have wanted 
the FTC to address through its flexible unfairness authority.  If anything, pre-
dictive analytics poses the greater threat.  Data security breaches injure pri-
vacy.  But irresponsible use of predictive analytics can cause privacy inva-
sions, manipulation, bias, and procedural unfairness.  If the FTC’s Section 5 
unfairness authority is broad enough to include unreasonably lax data secu-
rity measures, a fortiori it should encompass irresponsible predictive analyt-
ics practices.  The Third and Eleventh Circuits’ recent opinions on the FTC’s 
unfairness authority are thus consistent with the FTC Act’s plain language 
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and legislative history and with earlier judicial determinations on this ques-
tion. 
In sum, the plain language, legislative history, and judicial interpreta-
tions of Section 5 each support a broad interpretation of the FTC’s unfairness 
authority capable of meeting digital age threats.399  Were the FTC to declare 
harmful predictive analytics practices to be “unfair,” a court would very 
likely uphold this exercise of its enforcement authority. 
B.  First Amendment Concerns 
An FTC enforcement action against a company for its unfair use of pre-
dictive analytics should not offend the First Amendment.  The key distinction 
here is between speech about matters of public concern and speech about 
private or market topics.400  The First Amendment offers far stronger protec-
tion for speech that shapes public opinion—public discourse—than for 
speech that is merely a form of personal or market behavior.401  The latter 
category of speech acts “are not attempts to participate in the formation of 
public opinion by exchanging ideas, beliefs, and opinions.  Instead, they are 
forms of market behavior that use speech.  Therefore, states may regulate the 
speech involved in them.”402 
This Article is concerned primarily with predictive analytics-based eli-
gibility determinations (algorithmic adjudications).  Insofar as this data prac-
tice is speech at all,403 it is speech that is a form of market behavior.  This 
kind of speech generally is not intended to shape public opinion.404  Con-
sumer protection law can accordingly regulate it without running afoul of the 
First Amendment.  As Professor Jack Balkin explained: 
[T]he state can regulate what people say to each other as they form 
(or refuse to form) contracts, as it does in antitrust law, consumer 
protection law, and antidiscrimination law. . . . Therefore, without 
falling afoul of the First Amendment, governments can regulate 
contracts to prevent discrimination and unfair business practices; 
they can require companies to label their products and make dis-
closures to protect consumers; and they can require companies to 
disclose information about themselves and about their operations 
in order to protect investors.405 
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Thus, it would appear that, much like fiduciary law,406 commercial un-
fairness law can, consistent with the First Amendment, regulate business col-
lection and use of data for predictive analytics. 
C.  Is Unfairness Authority Too Controversial? 
If the above analysis is correct, and the FTC can legally use its unfair-
ness authority to address predictive analytics’ threats, then why has it not 
already done so?  The answer most likely lies in the FTC’s past exercise of 
unfairness authority and the intense controversy that it provoked.407  As ex-
plained above,408 the FTC’s expansive use of unfairness authority in the 
1970s provoked howls of protest from industry representatives and members 
of Congress concerned that the five FTC Commissioners would use their un-
fairness authority to constrain any business behavior that they personally 
found to be inequitable or immoral.  Congress even defunded the FTC for a 
few days just to make sure that it got the message.409  Would the FTC’s use 
of unfairness authority to govern the rapidly expanding commercial use of 
predictive analytics provoke a similar reaction? 
There are a number of reasons to believe that it would not.  First, the 
legal landscape is different.  The FTC limited the scope of its own unfairness 
authority when it issued the 1980 Policy Statement on Unfairness.410  Con-
gress further constrained the FTC when it amended the FTC Act in 1994 and 
added the three-prong unfairness test and the “established public policies” 
interpretative tool.411  Unlike the situation in the 1970s, a congressionally 
determined, statutory framework currently governs the FTC’s exercise of its 
unfairness authority. 
Second, as was explained above, the FTC has in the past decade suc-
cessfully used unfairness authority to enforce against unreasonably lax cor-
porate cybersecurity measures.412  Congress has acquiesced in this enterpris-
ing use of unfairness authority and the courts have approved it.  The FTC 
could build on this precedent in moving to declare certain predictive analytics 
practices to be unfair and so unlawful. 
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Finally, corporate behavior is already moving in this direction.  Sophis-
ticated companies that employ predictive analytics, machine learning, and AI 
are concluding that mere compliance with control-based privacy laws will 
not protect individuals and so will not protect the companies’ own reputa-
tions.  In recent years, industry-funded think tanks such as the Information 
Accountability Foundation and the Future of Privacy Forum have issued 
frameworks for the “ethical” practice of predictive analytics;413 major com-
panies have created a partnership committed to “fair and transparent” algo-
rithms;414 and “data ethics” has become a hot topic among corporate chief 
privacy officers.415  Companies interested in such measures might not re-
sist—indeed, some might even welcome—FTC guidance on how to draw the 
line between fair and unfair data practices.  The FTC may well be able to use 
its unfairness authority to create rules of the road for predictive analytics 
without encountering the resistance that it experienced in the 1970s. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
In their classic 1890 article The Right to Privacy, Justice Louis Brandeis 
and Samuel Warren argued that the law protected a person’s “right to be let 
alone.”416  They maintained that those who violated this right to privacy 
should be held liable in tort.  This argument, it is worth noting, does not call 
on individuals to draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable collec-
tion and use of their data.  It looks to legislatures and courts—the institutions 
that fashion tort law—to do so.  Brandeis and Warren’s theory of privacy and 
of privacy law is thus quite different from Professor Alan Westin’s.417  Wes-
tin defines privacy as individual control over personal information418 and 
looks to the legal system to provide this control through notice, consent, and 
purpose limitations.  By contrast, Brandeis and Warren define privacy as the 
“right to be let alone”419 and look to public authorities to define its boundaries 
and protect them through tort law.420 
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It is time to return privacy law to its roots.  It is time to move away from 
an over-reliance on individual control and move to a complementary and 
equal focus on social protection, on public authorities drawing substantive 
lines between those data practices that are socially appropriate and fair and 
those that are unfair.  Doing so will require hard value choices.  Was Target’s 
use of predictive analytics “unfair”?421  Was CompuCredit’s?422  These are 
not easy issues to resolve.  But if we want to live in a healthy way with the 
intensely powerful predictive technologies that increasingly order our lives, 
we have no choice but to ask these questions, wrestle with them, and demo-
cratically define the values that will structure the algorithmic economy.423  
Individual control should continue to play a role.  Where people can still 
make meaningful choices about the collection, use, and disclosure of their 
personal data,424 they should be given the opportunity to do so. But where 
they cannot, we do them no favors by asking them to make illusory choices.  
Where people cannot protect themselves, society needs to protect them.  That 
is the lesson that landlord-tenant law learned so many years ago when it re-
linquished caveat lessee in favor of the implied warranty of habitability.  It 
is the lesson that privacy law should learn today. 
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